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Retirement savings

Washington spent four years saying private equity doesn't fit a 401(k). Reversing it for 90 million savers took twelve months.

Summary

In December 2021, the Labor Department warned that typical 401(k) fiduciaries 'are not likely suited' to evaluate private equity for workers' accounts. In August 2025, an executive order called that guidance 'stifling' and DOL rescinded it within five days. In March 2026 came the proposed rule: a safe harbor under which fiduciaries who document six factors — fees, liquidity, valuation, benchmarking, performance, and whether participants can understand what they own — get court deference for putting private equity, private credit, real estate, and crypto into the menus of plans holding roughly $12 trillion. The comment period closed June 1 with more than 20,000 comments; the final rule is pending now. The fee gap it opens: about 0.3% for a typical 401(k) equity fund versus '2 and 20' for private equity.

By Augustus · July 10, 2026

The finding, in one paragraph: the largest pool of ordinary Americans' savings — the participant-directed retirement system, more than 90 million people by the executive order's own count — is being opened to the highest-fee, hardest-to-value asset classes in finance, through a regulatory sequence that ran from presidential signature to guidance rescission in five days, and to a proposed liability shield in under eight months. The safest summary of the stakes is the one the government itself wrote twice: in 2021, when the Labor Department said typical plan fiduciaries lack the expertise to evaluate these assets; and in 2026, when its own proposed rule enumerated the six things that can go wrong — fees, liquidity, valuation, benchmarks, performance, and participant comprehension — as the checklist whose completion will now confer legal deference.

The documents

Four documents anchor this piece. Executive Order 14330, Democratizing Access to Alternative Assets for 401(k) Investors (August 7, 2025), read directly — including its characterization of prior guidance as "stifling" and litigation as the work of "opportunistic trial lawyers." The Labor Department's December 21, 2021 Supplemental Statement and its August 12, 2025 rescission's site blocks retrieval, so their language is quoted via the retirement-industry associations' contemporaneous records of the releases. And the March 30, 2026 proposed rule ("Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives"), classified economically significant at , whose six-factor safe harbor is documented across the legal-bar analyses cited below.

Participants affected
90M+
the executive order's own count
Guidance reversal time
5 days
EO signed Aug 7; caution rescinded Aug 12
Status now
Final rule pending
comments closed June 1 — 20,000+ filed

The money

The fee ladder the menu is climbing
Annual management fees by investment vehicle, percent of assets
Broad index fund
0.1%
Typical 401(k) equity fund
0.3%
Private equity management fee
2%
Source: Standard '2 and 20' private-equity terms and industry-average 401(k) fund expenses, as documented in the rulemaking coverage; carried interest excluded from the bars
View data as table
Fees, and the arithmetic of a 10% allocation
Broad market index fund≈0.05%/yr
Typical 401(k) equity mutual fund≈0.3%/yr
Private equity≈2%/yr + 20% of gains'2 and 20' — before any liquidity or valuation frictions
Illustrative drag10% allocation ≈ +0.17%/yrarithmetic: shifting a tenth of a portfolio from 0.3% to 2% fees

Fees are the one certainty in the debate. Returns are contested — the industry cites institutional private-market performance; critics note appraisal-smoothed valuations flatter both returns and volatility — but the fee gap is contractual: roughly 2 percent of assets annually plus 20 percent of gains, against 0.3 percent for the average 401(k) equity fund and 0.05 percent for an index fund. The arithmetic in the table is illustrative but mechanical: a 10 percent menu allocation at private-equity fee levels adds about 0.17 percentage points of drag to a whole portfolio, every year, compounding across a working lifetime — the same compounding argument that made index funds the default in the first place.

The reversal

From signature to safe harbor
Days from Executive Order 14330 to each step
Guidance rescinded
5
Rule sent to OMB
159
Proposed rule published
235
Comments closed
298
Source: EO 14330 (Aug. 7, 2025); DOL rescission (Aug. 12, 2025); OIRA receipt (Jan. 13, 2026); NPRM (Mar. 30, 2026); comment close (June 1, 2026)
View data as table
The rulemaking timeline
Dec. 21, 2021DOL caution issuedtypical plan fiduciaries 'not likely suited' to evaluate PE
Aug. 7, 2025EO 14330 signedthe 2021 caution called 'stifling'
Aug. 12, 2025caution rescinded5 days later
Mar. 30, 2026proposed rule publishedsafe harbor with deference for documented six-factor review
June 1, 2026comments closed20,000+ filed; final rule can follow OMB review

The cross-examination

The two positions in this fight were both written by the Department of Labor. The 2021 Supplemental Statement's core finding — issued after reviewing the same 2020 information letter the new EO celebrates — was about capability, not asset quality: plan-level fiduciaries of typical individual-account plans "are not likely suited" to perform the "complex evaluation" private equity requires. The 2026 proposed rule does not refute that finding; it restructures the consequence. Under the safe harbor, a fiduciary who documents a review of six factors — performance history, total-cost transparency, liquidity, valuation methodology, benchmarking, and "an honest assessment of whether participants can reasonably understand what they are investing in" — earns judicial deference. The six factors are, item for item, the risk catalog the 2021 statement worried typical fiduciaries couldn't evaluate. What changed between the two documents is not the risks; it is who bears them when the evaluation is wrong. And the EO's stated premise — that alternatives offer "the very same long-term net benefits... achieved by public pension plans" — is precisely the contested question: pension allocations are negotiated at institutional scale with institutional fee breaks and no daily liquidity requirement, none of which describes a participant-directed account that must price and redeem daily.

What happens next

The final rule can publish after 's minimum 30-day review of the post-comment draft — late 2026 on the current path. Then the market answers: recordkeepers must build daily-valued wrappers around quarterly-valued assets; target-date managers decide whether the safe harbor justifies the litigation risk the EO could not actually extinguish (ERISA's statutory duties remain); and the first generation of products discloses its fees. The measurable outcomes arrive slowly and publicly — in Form 5500 filings, fee disclosures, and, eventually, the performance record of the first cohort. The 2021 statement and the 2026 rule are both on the record; one of them will age well.

The takeaway

  • The fee gap is the only settled number. '2 and 20' against 0.3 percent is contractual fact; everything else — returns, volatility, liquidity in a crisis — is projection. A rule that defers to documented process decides who pays if the projections miss.
  • The safe harbor converts the risk list into a checklist. The six factors are the government's own enumeration of what can go wrong; documenting that you considered them is now the shield, not the solution.
  • Ninety million people, defaulted in. Most 401(k) money flows through target-date defaults chosen by employers. The menu decision this rule protects is one most participants will never know was made.

EO 14330 was read directly; 's 2021 statement, 2025 rescission, and 2026 proposed rule are quoted from releases as preserved in the retirement-industry and legal-bar records cited, 's website having blocked direct retrieval. Fee figures are standard industry terms as documented in the rulemaking coverage; the 0.17-point drag is arithmetic, not an official estimate.

Sources

  • Executive Order 14330, Democratizing Access to Alternative Assets for 401(k) Investors (Aug. 7, 2025) — the 90-million figure, the "stifling" characterization, the directive to , , and Treasury. whitehouse.gov
  • U.S. Department of Labor, Supplemental Statement on private equity in participant-directed plans (Dec. 21, 2021) and rescission (Aug. 12, 2025) — the "not likely suited" finding and its withdrawal, per releases and ASPPA/PSCA records. dol.gov
  • U.S. Department of Labor, proposed rule Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives (NPRM, Mar. 30, 2026) — the six-factor safe harbor, economically-significant designation, comment period; as documented in the department's release and the Ogletree, Morrison Foerster, and Seyfarth analyses. dol.gov
  • Bipartisan Policy Center, Alternative Assets in 401(k)s, Explained — pension private-market allocations (23% as of 2022), product structures (e.g., 90/10 designs). bipartisanpolicy.org
  • Rulemaking coverage documenting fee terms and the comment count — Journal of Accountancy, Morningstar, and Investing.com analyses cited in-line.
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