The Army's own tool found Chinese sources in the 155mm supply chain
Summary
Congress gave DOD $25.9 billion to replace weapons sent to Ukraine and expand the factories that make them. Two GAO reports, about 15 months apart, show where that money went and what it's still running into. In April 2024, GAO found DOD had committed more than $2.8 billion to expanding production across nine weapon programs -- with 155mm artillery ammunition alone taking $2.089 billion of it, part of a push to grow output from 168,000 to 1.2 million rounds a year. In July 2025, GAO found that even in ammunition -- the one supply chain where DOD has unusually good visibility, because it owns the designs -- the Army's own tracking tool had identified Chinese sources still embedded inside it.
Where the money went
Since February 2022, has committed or obligated more than $2.8 billion in supplemental funding to expand industrial-base production capacity across nine weapon programs -- from Javelin and Stinger missiles to armored vehicles and solid rocket motors. One program dominates the ledger: 155mm artillery ammunition alone accounts for $2.089 billion of the $2.867 billion tracked, funding new and expanded metal-shell-production facilities, modernized propellant-charge production, and added workforce and shifts.
View data as table
| 155mm artillery ammunition | 2,089 |
|---|---|
| Other 8 weapon programs combined | 778 |
A sevenfold production target
The goal behind that spending is a production increase and describe as roughly 700%: from 168,000 to 1.2 million 155mm rounds a year. To get there, the Army is qualifying additional suppliers for metal shells and metal forging, and has been trying to establish domestic sources for the critical chemicals used to manufacture the shells, to cut reliance on China and other foreign suppliers. Part of that buildout is a new modular metal-parts facility in Mesquite, Texas -- built to help meet the growing demand, and operated by a Canadian firm, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems. Even so, has reported difficulty obtaining materials like propellants, in part because demand for them is surging across industries and countries at once.
View data as table
| Current rate (rounds/year) | 168,000 |
|---|---|
| Targeted rate (rounds/year) | 1,200,000 |
What the investment buys in time
The U.S. has already sent Ukraine more than 3 million rounds of 155mm ammunition. 's analysis of the funded expansion found the payoff is mostly about speed: if hits its targeted production rate, it could produce 2 million more rounds in under 2 years. At the 2022 rate that existed before the expansion began, the same 2 million rounds would have taken nearly 12 years.
View data as table
| At 2022 pre-expansion production rate | 12 |
|---|---|
| If the funded expansion is achieved | 2 |
Even the Army's best-mapped supply chain still has Chinese sources in it
estimates that more than 200,000 suppliers help produce its weapons and other goods, and the government's primary procurement database gives little visibility into where most of that material actually comes from. Ammunition is the exception: because develops the designs and owns the data rights, the Army has significantly more insight into that supply chain than almost anywhere else in the department, built through an Industrial Base Analysis Tool it has used since 2004. Even there, using that tool, the Army identified several Chinese sources inside the 155mm ammunition supply chain. made three recommendations aimed at giving better, department-wide visibility into foreign dependency risks -- assigning an office to lead the effort, adopting commercial best practices, and testing whether contractors can be required to disclose country-of-origin information. concurred with all three.
The takeaway
- Nearly three-quarters of 's tracked Ukraine-related production-expansion money rode on one ammunition type. 155mm shells took $2.089 billion of the $2.867 billion tracked across nine weapon programs -- funding a targeted jump from 168,000 to 1.2 million rounds a year.
- The expansion is fundamentally about compressing time, not just adding capacity. 's own analysis found the funded buildout could let produce 2 million rounds in under 2 years -- versus nearly 12 years at the rate that existed before the war in Ukraine began.
- Even 's best-visibility supply chain still has a foreign-dependency blind spot. The Army has tracked its ammunition supply chain since 2004, in a way it can't for most of its 200,000-plus suppliers -- and using that same tool, it still found Chinese sources embedded inside the 155mm supply chain it's racing to expand.
Findings on Ukraine supplemental funding, the industrial-base expansion investments, and the production-timeline analysis are from -24-106649, 'Ukraine: Status and Challenges of Weapon Replacement Efforts' (April 30, 2024), read directly in full via an archived copy after the current gao.gov asset URL blocked direct access. Findings on foreign-supplier dependency risk, the 168,000-to-1.2-million production target, the Mesquite facility, and the Army's Industrial Base Analysis Tool are from -25-107283, 'Defense Industrial Base: Actions Needed to Address Risks Posed by Dependence on Foreign Suppliers' (July 24, 2025), read directly in full. The two reports examine the same 155mm production surge from two angles about 15 months apart -- one tracking the funding and production targets, the other testing how well actually knows who supplies that production.
Sources(2) ▾
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DOD Weapon Replacement Efforts (2024-04-30) — -24-106649, a Q&A report to congressional committees (mandated by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023) tracking 's use of $25.9 billion in Ukraine supplemental funding to replace weapons and expand production capacity -- the funding-and-production-target facet. Distinct from doc-gao25-107283 (the foreign-supplier-dependency-risk facet, published about 15 months later). Direct gao.gov PDF fetch returns HTTP 403; fetched via an existing Wayback capture. gao.gov · original document
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Industrial Base: Actions Needed to Address Risks Posed by Dependence on Foreign Suppliers (2025-07-24) — -25-107283, a report to congressional committees (mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024) examining 's visibility into foreign dependency risks in its supply chains, using 155mm ammunition as one of three illustrative examples. Published about 15 months after doc-gao24-106649, examining the supply-chain-risk side of the same production expansion that report tracked from the funding side. Fetched directly from files.gao.gov (HTTP 200); direct gao.gov PDF asset returns HTTP 403. gao.gov · original document
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Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine drove demand for artillery shells far beyond what the U.S. defense industrial base was built to produce. Congress responded with $113.4 billion across four Ukraine supplemental appropriations acts, $25.9 billion of it earmarked for to replace weapons sent to Ukraine and expand the capacity to make more. In April 2024⧉, tracked how was spending that money and what it expected to get for it. In July 2025⧉ -- about 15 months later -- examined a different question about the same supply chains: how well actually knows who's in them, using 155mm ammunition as one of its central examples.