Banning's Electric Utility Burned a $31M Surplus Into a $9M Hole
Summary
A June 2026 Riverside County Civil Grand Jury report found Banning's municipal electric utility swung from a $31 million surplus in 2018 to a $9 million deficit, after voters rejected letting the city tap that surplus for other uses -- while jurors flagged a $1.84 million single-month interfund transfer, a $153,000 forensic report the city won't fully release, and ten city managers in twelve years.
A transfer voters said no to
California's Proposition 26 bars cities from using utility rates to generate general revenue beyond the cost of service; moving a municipal utility's surplus into the general fund requires voter approval. Banning asked for that approval in November 2018 with Measure P, which would have capped BEU-to-General-Fund transfers at 7.5% of gross electric revenue⧉ -- and voters rejected it. No authorization to transfer BEU surplus followed.
Yet the City's own Budgetary and Fiscal Policies, handed to the Grand Jury in September 2025, authorize a 10% annual transfer⧉ of BEU operational revenue to the General Fund -- a standing policy with no voter authorization behind it. Pulling a random sample of one month of BEU ledgers, Dec. 2018, jurors found a $1,840,636 interfund transfer labeled "Administrative Services"⧉ that an interim Finance Director flagged, unprompted, as looking out of place -- a former BEU executive separately told jurors that questionable transfers could more broadly be found in the ledgers under the same "Administrative Transfers" category.
View data as table
| 2018 | +$31M | surplus |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 / 2025 | -$9M | deficit, unresolved as of the report |
Two reports that never answered the question
Twice, Banning paid outside firms to explain the deficit, and twice the public was left without an answer. The City spent $153,000 on a forensic investigation by Green, Hasson & Janks (GHJ)⧉ after the shortfall surfaced -- then withheld the full report from the Grand Jury and the public, citing attorney-client privilege on the procedures GHJ says it was directed to perform. Separately, the City contracted Urban Futures Inc. at $275 an hour in 2025⧉ to write a BEU recovery-plan report that, jurors were told, would address the possible illegal transfers directly. After an extended engagement, the firm abruptly stopped and never delivered it.
View data as table
| Flagged Dec. 2018 transfer | $1,840,636 | one randomly-sampled month |
|---|---|---|
| GHJ forensic report | $153,000 | findings withheld |
| Extra Eide Bailly audit cost | $145,000 | due to Finance Dept. understaffing |
Junk bonds and a revolving door
The consequences reached Banning's credit. The city's 2007 electric system revenue bonds, $45.79 million issued at an A- rating⧉, were downgraded by S&P Global to BBB in March 2024, then to BB with a negative outlook in May 2024, and had fallen to B -- junk status -- by the time the Grand Jury wrote its report⧉.
Underneath the finances sits a staffing collapse: Banning employed ten City Managers between 2014 and 2026⧉, eight of them on an "interim" basis, and only one held the job more than six years. The Finance Department fared no better -- four Finance Directors in five years, then two temporary annuitants -- and the resulting gap forced the City's 2024 auditor, Eide Bailly, to bring its own staff to gather records, adding $145,000 to the audit's cost⧉. Eide Bailly's own conclusion, quoted in the report: "The City is currently in a severe financial crisis."
Policy on paper only
The Grand Jury's personnel findings extend past finance. One staff member carried a $5,000 monthly purchasing-card limit and a signed agreement not to buy restricted items⧉, then racked up meals, rideshares and gift cards on the card with no waiver on file. In a separate account, the report describes an employee hired despite an extensive felony record -- grand theft, burglary, forgery -- after staff were directed by a former City Manager to disregard a date-of-birth mismatch on a pre-employment background check, an employee the report says was "also given a purchasing card with a $5,000 monthly limit" -- the same figure as the earlier violation, which the report itself uses as the link between the two accounts without stating outright that they are the same person.
Separately, a harassment complaint filed with Human Resources in March 2025 was never investigated⧉: HR staff told jurors it had been delegated to the very person the complaint was filed against, violating the City's own policy requiring such complaints go to the City Clerk for City Council review.
- A voter-rejected transfer kept happening anyway. Banning voters said no to moving BEU surplus into the General Fund in 2018; the City's own current policy still authorizes a 10% annual transfer, and a single flagged month showed $1.84 million moving out under an unexplained line item.
- Two paid investigations, zero public answers. The City spent $153,000 on a forensic report it won't fully release and $275/hour on a recovery-plan report that was never delivered -- the two efforts most likely to explain the deficit both ended without a public accounting.
- The instability compounds itself. Ten city managers in twelve years and four finance directors in five left Banning's own 2024 auditor needing to do extra work just to gather the numbers -- while the utility's bonds fell from investment grade to junk in about two years.
All figures are from the Riverside County Civil Grand Jury's report "Banning: A City Alarmingly Mismanaged" (issued June 8, 2026, made public June 24, 2026), read in full via direct PDF fetch and pdftotext extraction. A pre-existing archive.org snapshot from July 1, 2026 was confirmed live and used as the archiveUrl; inline citations and the capture both point to Riverside County's own hosted PDF.
The $40 million swing figure, the $298,000 combined outside-cost total, and the roughly-27-month bond-collapse duration are this outlet's own arithmetic on the report's stated figures (methods and caveats in analysis.json) -- the Grand Jury does not itself state a combined swing, a combined outside-cost total, or a bond-collapse duration. Required responses from Banning's Mayor, City Council, City Treasurer, and the invited City Manager and Riverside County Board of Supervisors were due 60-90 days from the report's June 2026 issuance; this piece reflects only what the report itself states as of publication. A blind adversarial verifier, working from the primary document alone with no access to this draft, independently checked every itemized fact; see verification.json.
Sources(1) ▾
- Riverside County Civil Grand Jury, Banning: A City Alarmingly Mismanaged (2025-2026 Riverside County Civil Grand Jury Report) (2026-06-08) — The primary investigative report: an 18-page civil grand jury investigation into the City of Banning's municipal electric utility, general-fund transfers, cost allocation practices, bond rating, billing system, and personnel/policy failures. Source for every dollar figure, finding, and quote in this piece, including the underlying Eide Bailly audit and GHJ forensic-investigation findings the Grand Jury quotes directly. rivco.gov · original document
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The Banning Electric Utility (BEU), the municipal power company for a city of about 32,000 people in Riverside County, California, went from a $31 million surplus in 2018 to a $9 million deficit by 2022⧉ -- a deficit the 2025-2026 Riverside County Civil Grand Jury's June 2026 report⧉ says still stood as of 2025. The utility isn't a side operation: per the City's own strategic-planning document, electric billing brought in roughly $58 million of the city's $104 million total 2022-2023 budget⧉ -- more than half of everything Banning collects. The Grand Jury's eight findings describe a city where that money moved out of the utility without authorization, two paid outside reviews never surfaced what happened, and turnover left almost nobody in place long enough to explain it.