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BLM Federal Helium Program royalty collection

BLM Left $995,385 in Helium Royalties on the Table

Summary

A Department of the Interior inspector general inspection found that the Bureau of Land Management's nine-person Federal Leased Lands team in Amarillo, Texas has collected Federal Helium Program royalties since 1991 without ever writing down how -- no policy manual, no records-management system, and, until December 2024, no program review at all. Over five years the team audited 6 of the 14 companies paying royalties, recovering $56,475 against nearly $160 million audited, while $851,000 sat uncollected from companies that had stopped paying, some for up to a decade. Total monetary impact identified: $995,385, against $165.8 million the program collected the same five years -- and BLM has formally refused to chase the smallest piece of it.

By Marcus Aurelius · July 21, 2026

Every gas stream pulled from Federal land that contains helium belongs, by law, to the United States -- and the Bureau of Land Management is supposed to collect royalties on it. A nine-person team in 's Amarillo, Texas field office, the Federal Leased Lands (FLL) team, has run that job since 1991. A February 2026 inspection by the Interior Department's Office of Inspector General -- the department's independent internal watchdog, whose findings the bureau must formally answer -- found the team collected $165.8 million in royalties from 14 companies over fiscal years 2020 through 2024 -- and, for most of the 30-plus years it has existed, did so with no written procedures for identifying wells, tracking agreements, chasing nonpayment, or auditing the companies that pay. 's tally of what that gap cost: $995,385.

Thirty years, no manual, one review

The FLL team operates on nonappropriated funds generated from the royalties it collects -- any excess goes to the U.S. Treasury. The program's December 2024 Program Review -- the first review had ever conducted on it, performed by three staff outside the FLL team -- found no written manual and no systematic method for identifying new wells; the report quotes it describing production discoveries happening "randomly through news articles ... a call to the ... or email inquir[ies]." The Interior 's own inspection reached the same conclusion: did not always identify, track, collect, or properly oversee Federal Helium Program royalties. As the New Mexico State Office's Deputy State Director for Minerals put it, the team existed "in the shadow" with limited oversight.

Total monetary impact found
$995,385
FY2014-2024: $851,000 in potentially delinquent royalties, $96,385/year in inefficient oversight salary costs, and $48,000 in a penalty never once assessed
Royalties collected, FY2020-24
$165.8M
From 14 companies through a 9-person Amarillo, Texas team that has run the program since 1991 without a policy manual
Audit recovery rate
0.04%
8 audits over 5 years returned $56,475 against nearly $160 million in royalties from the companies audited
Helium royalties BLM's Amarillo team collected, FY2020-2024
Annual royalty revenue from 14 helium companies, Federal Leased Lands team
FY2020
22,999,728
FY2021
24,240,770
FY2022
31,973,099
FY2023
39,118,723
FY2024
47,482,772
Source: DOI OIG, Report 2025-ISP-013, Figure 1
View data as table
Royalty revenue from the sale of Federal helium, collected by BLM's Federal Leased Lands team in Amarillo, Texas, rose every year from FY2020 through FY2024 -- from $22.99 million to $47.48 million, a total of $165,815,092 over the five years -- even as auditors found the team lacked basic written procedures for tracking, collecting, or overseeing that money.
FY202022,999,728
FY202124,240,770
FY202231,973,099
FY202339,118,723
FY202447,482,772

A penalty on the books, never once used

's own helium agreements require companies to report additions and deletions to their well lists every January, and let assess a $1,000 penalty for every year a company skips it. The FLL team has never assessed that penalty on a single company. calculated that doing so during the five-year review window alone would have collected at least $48,000. The same gap in tracking meant the FLL team accepted $3.1 million in royalty payments from seven companies that had no helium agreement with in place at all -- payments the team had no formal basis to verify as correct or hold the payer accountable for.

Companies stopped paying. Nobody found out why.

Five companies stopped sending royalty payments at various points since 2014, some for as long as a decade, before 's inspection even asked about it. When the FLL Branch Chief was asked for a list of delinquent payers, it took seven weeks to produce a one-page document -- built for the inspection, not from any regular tracking -- estimating $851,000 potentially owed. The document's own explanation for the nonpayment: "more research required." As of May 2025, still had no plan to pursue any of it.

Where the $995,385 monetary impact comes from
OIG's three components of lost or inefficiently spent money, FY2014-2024
Potentially delinquent royalties
851,000
Inefficient oversight (per year)
96,385
Uncollected reporting penalties
48,000
Source: DOI OIG, Report 2025-ISP-013, Attachment 2
View data as table
OIG's $995,385 total monetary-impact finding breaks into three pieces: $851,000 in royalties potentially owed by companies that stopped paying, some as long as 10 years ago; $96,385 a year in salary spent on oversight audits that OIG found did not independently verify anything; and $48,000 in a reporting penalty BLM's own agreements allow it to assess but never has. BLM agreed to pursue the delinquent-royalty recovery and to fix its audit practice, but formally declined to pursue the $48,000, calling the effort disproportionate to the amount.
Potentially delinquent royalties851,0005 companies, some unpaid up to 10 years, no recovery plan as of May 2025
Inefficient oversight (per year)96,385Estimated annual salary cost of audits that never independently verified company data
Uncollected reporting penalties48,000A $1,000-per-year penalty clause BLM has never once assessed; BLM disputes recovering even this

The audits that call themselves audits

The FLL team calls its royalty checks "audits," but found staff never independently verified the production figures companies reported -- they simply checked that a company's royalty payment matched the production volume the same company had claimed. Over the five-year scope, the team audited only 6 of the 14 paying companies, and spent 78% of its audit time on companies that accounted for under 6% of total royalties. The eight audits it completed took an average of 267 days and recovered an average of $7,059 each -- $56,475 total against nearly $160 million in royalties paid by the companies audited, a 0.04% return. Exclude the single audit that found real money, and the other seven combined turned up $9.50: one review found $0.87 owed by the company; another ended with the government paying the company $35.50 back. put the salary cost of running these unverified checks at $96,385 a year.

BLM will chase $851,000. Not $48,000.

concurred with six of 's seven recommendations, including compliance reviews aimed at recovering the $851,000 in potential delinquencies and a new risk-based audit approach that conforms to the practices its sister royalty office already uses for oil and gas. It did not concur with recovering the $48,000 in never-assessed reporting penalties, telling that "conducting a retrospective analysis to identify companies that failed to submit annual well listings would require a disproportionate amount of staff time and resources relative to the estimated amount of uncollected penalties." disagreed, noting already has the well and agreement data needed and calling the recommendation unresolved. The figures independently reappear in the DOI OIG's semiannual report to Congress covering the same period, with the same $995,385 total.

  • After 30-plus years, the program still has no standard operating procedures. The first program review in the FLL team's history -- December 2024, by 's own staff -- found new production was discovered by chance, not a system; the written procedures has now promised carry target dates of December 31, 2026 and March 31, 2027.
  • never once used a penalty it wrote into its own contracts. A $1,000-per-year reporting penalty went unassessed on every company, every year, worth at least $48,000 over the five-year window reviewed -- and has now formally declined to go back and collect it.
  • Audits recovered four cents on every hundred dollars they covered. $56,475 back against nearly $160 million audited over five years and 267 days per review, because the checks confirmed company-reported numbers rather than independently verifying them.
  • $851,000 sat with five companies that simply stopped paying, some for up to 10 years, before anyone asked why. has now committed to chasing that money; it had no plan to as of May 2025.

's $995,385 monetary-impact figure spans fiscal years 2014 through 2024, wider than the FY2020-2024 window used for the royalty-collection and audit-coverage figures above; both windows are drawn directly from Report 2025-ISP-013. The report's issuance was delayed roughly six weeks by the Interior Department's October-November 2025 appropriations lapse. provided implementation target dates of December 31, 2026 and March 31, 2027 for the six recommendations it accepted.

Sources(3) ▾
  • U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, BLM Has Opportunities To Improve Its Helium Royalty Collection Program (Report No. 2025-ISP-013) (2026-02-12)Final inspection report, 17 pages, fetched directly and read in full including both attachments and 's written response. Covers 's Federal Leased Lands (FLL) team's helium royalty collection operations, Amarillo, Texas, for FYs 2020-2024, with monetary-impact findings reaching back to FY2014. Report issuance was delayed by the DOI appropriations lapse of October 1-November 12, 2025. doioig.gov · original document
  • U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period Ending March 31, 2026 (2026-05-28)DOI 's statutory semiannual report to Congress; the 'Highlights From the Office of Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations' section independently restates Report 2025-ISP-013's headline monetary-impact and royalty-total figures in a separate document produced by a separate publication process, corroborating them outside the underlying inspection report itself. doioig.gov · original document
  • U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, OIG Hotline (2026-07-21)Re-fetched to verify the public reporting channel named in the CTA; confirms the hotline accepts reports of fraud, waste, abuse, misconduct, or mismanagement at DOI bureaus including , with general/confidential/anonymous complaint options. doioig.gov · original document
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