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CISA's Cybersecurity Retention Incentive program, audited by the DHS Office of Inspector General

's 'Unique Talent' Incentive Reached Nearly Half Its Staff

Summary

A pay bonus built to retain 's rarest cyber talent reached nearly half the agency. A inspector general found $138.2 million paid since FY2020 — including $1.41 million in back pay to 348 people that no record explains.

By Marcus Aurelius · September 25, 2026

built the Cybersecurity Retention Incentive⧉ in 2015 for a rare few: cyber specialists too valuable to lose to private-sector pay. A September 2025 DHS inspector general audit⧉ found that in a single 2024 pay period, 43.5 percent of 's entire workforce was drawing it — including public-affairs and workforce-engagement staff with no cybersecurity role. Total paid since FY2020: $138.2 million.

Total Cyber Incentive paid
$138.2M
Paid by to its own workforce, FY2020 through FY2024 Q3 -- a program found did not manage efficiently or effectively
Unallowable back pay
$1.41M
Paid to 348 recipients with no documented explanation could find -- flagged as questioned costs
Workforce receiving it
43.5%
1,401 of 's 3,220 employees drew the incentive in a single 2024 pay period, spanning every division

A program that never shrank

's Cyber Incentive spending rose every year the auditor reviewed⧉ — from $21.5 million to 897 employees in FY2020 to $31.9 million to 1,493 in FY2024, a partial year that still set the recipient record. 's HR office never kept a single tally of who got paid; auditors had to rebuild the numbers from four inconsistent internal reports.

Five years of growth, no year of decline
's Cyber Incentive payments by fiscal year, FY2020 through FY2024 (Q3)
FY2020
21,473,977
FY2021
24,379,121
FY2022
28,236,173
FY2023
32,157,538
FY2024 (Q3)
31,927,791
Source: , -25-38, Table 2 (p.10)
View data as table
had to reconstruct this table itself: 's Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer did not maintain a report tracking the total number of Cyber Incentive recipients and corresponding payments, so auditors merged four different, inconsistent reports to build it.
FY2020$21,473,977 (897 recipients)
FY2021$24,379,121 (984 recipients)
FY2022$28,236,173 (1,125 recipients)
FY2023$32,157,538 (1,312 recipients)
FY2024 (Q3)$31,927,791 (1,493 recipients)
Total, FY2020-FY2024 Q3$138,174,600

'Mission-critical' stretched to a third of the agency

The rule requires a job to demand unusually high or unique cyber skills. tested 25 CISA position descriptions⧉ and found not one documented that way — not even inside 's own Cybersecurity Division. In July 2021 had quietly cut the required share of cyber work from 51 percent to 30 percent; that policy expired in July 2022, but OCHCO confirmed the agency kept paying at the looser bar through the end of the 2024 audit. A 2019 internal memo had warned against exactly this drift: 'Only positions that have been identified as mission critical are eligible.'

Nearly three-quarters of the Cybersecurity Division got it -- so did a tenth of Emergency Communications
Share of each division/office receiving the Cyber Incentive, Pay Period 13 of calendar year 2024
Cybersecurity Division
72.5%
National Risk Management Center
65.2%
Stakeholder Engagement Division
44.3%
Mission Support Offices
32.7%
Integrated Operations Division
24.2%
Infrastructure Security Division
22%
Emergency Communications
9.6%
Source: , -25-38, Table 1 (p.7-8)
View data as table
Every division and mission-support office had recipients, including offices found had no direct cybersecurity role -- strategic planning, public affairs, and workforce engagement among them.
Cybersecurity Division72.5%
National Risk Management Center65.2%
Stakeholder Engagement Division44.3%
Mission Support Offices32.7%
Integrated Operations Division24.2%
Infrastructure Security Division22.0%
Emergency Communications9.6%
CISA-wide total43.5% (1,401 of 3,220)

$1.41 million nobody can explain

The sharpest finding stands apart from the eligibility fight. paid $1.41 million in back pay⧉ to 348 recipients between FY2022 and FY2024 with no documentation of why — money out, no paper trail. flagged the full amount as questioned costs and told to determine whether to recover improper payments program-wide. agreed and set an August 31, 2026 date; the inspector general judged the response not fully responsive and left the recommendation open.

  • A program built to be narrow reached nearly half the agency. 1,401 of 's 3,220 employees drew the Cyber Incentive in a single 2024 pay period, spanning every division — including offices found had no direct cybersecurity role.
  • loosened its own rule, then kept running on the loosened version after it expired. The July 2021 cut from 51 percent to 30 percent expired in July 2022; OCHCO confirmed it never reverted, through the end of the 2024 audit.
  • $1.41 million has no paper trail, and repayment is still an open question. found no documentation for that back pay and flagged it as questioned cost; the recommendation to determine whether to recover improper payments program-wide remains open, not closed by 's concurrence.

No or employee is named in this piece; the audit identifies findings by office and role ("a official," "a senior OCHCO official"), not by name, and this piece follows that convention. "Questioned costs" is a federal audit term for spending an agency could not document as justified -- it is not, on its own, a finding of fraud or theft. All figures are drawn directly from 's published report (-25-38, September 11, 2025); 's corrective-action completion dates (July 31 and August 31, 2026) are the agency's own self-set targets, not independently confirmed completions.

Sources(2) ▾
  • U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, CISA Mismanaged Cybersecurity Retention Incentive Program and Wasted Funds, Risking Critical Talent Retention (OIG-25-38) (2025-09-11) — The primary document -- a 24-page performance audit of 's Cybersecurity Retention Incentive (Cyber Incentive) program. Read in full: the transmittal memorandum (8 recommendations, concurrence, Recommendation 7 left open/unresolved), the Highlights page, Background, all three Results-of-Audit findings, the Conclusion, all 8 Recommendations, Management Comments and Analysis for each recommendation, Appendix A (Objective, Scope, and Methodology), Appendix B ('s full comment letter), Table 1 (Cyber Incentive recipients by division, Pay Period 13 2024), and Table 2 (Cyber Incentive recipients and dollar amounts by fiscal year, FY2020-FY2024 Q3). Retrieved and hash-verified directly from the 's own domain. oig.dhs.gov · original document
  • U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Report Fraud, Waste, Abuse, or Mismanagement -- DHS OIG Hotline (2026-07-22) — The 's own public hotline page, fetched this iteration to source the call-to-action: phone number, mailing address, and online reporting portal -- the same office ( ) that produced -25-38, one organizational level above 's own OCHCO, which administers the audited program. oig.dhs.gov · original document
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