The Program Built to Cut Health Spending Raised It Instead
Summary
In 2010, Congress built the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation inside CMS with one job: test new ways to pay for Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP that lower federal health spending. A March 2026 GAO audit found that in 15 years, the center has obligated $11.4 billion testing 70 payment models -- and CMS has certified just four of them, a 5.7% hit rate, for permanent nationwide use. The Congressional Budget Office's own check on the program found it did the opposite of its job: net federal spending rose by $5.4 billion from 2011 through 2020, not down.
The center's process runs in four phases: identify a payment idea, design a model and estimate its likely effect on federal spending, build the infrastructure and recruit participants, then operate and evaluate it for a testing period -- typically under 10 years⧉. To go from test to permanent policy, a model has to clear a bar administers itself: its Office of the Actuary has to certify that expanding the model won't increase net program spending, and has to determine the expansion won't cut beneficiary coverage. In practice, that means officials look for a 90-to-95% likelihood⧉ the model would reduce federal spending before certifying it -- a demanding threshold only four of the 70 models tested since 2011 have cleared.
Four ideas that worked
The Pioneer Accountable Care Organization Model⧉ gave experienced provider groups more responsibility for costs and savings; it produced $384 million in Medicare savings in its first two years (2012-2016), and folded its elements into the Medicare Shared Savings Program in 2015. Prior-authorization requirements on repeated non-emergency ambulance rides -- the kind billed for routine dialysis trips -- saved $1 billion over five years of testing (2014-2020) and were rolled into other compliance programs in 2020. A Home Health Value-Based Purchasing Model that rewarded home health agencies for better outcomes saved $949 million from 2016 to 2020 and was expanded in 2022. And a diabetes-prevention coaching program for Medicare beneficiaries with prediabetes saved $2,650 per participant in its first 15 months, expanding in 2018. Three more tested models -- the Accountable Care Organization Investment Model, the Maryland All-Payer Model, and the Medicare Care Choices Model -- also produced net savings during testing but were never expanded, officials said, for reasons including limited participation.
View data as table
| Models Tested Since 2011 | 70 | 46 concluded, 24 still active as of January 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Certified for Nationwide Expansion | 4 | Pioneer ACO, Diabetes Prevention, Ambulance Prior Authorization, Home Health VBP |
CBO's independent check found the opposite
The four successes are real, but they are a small fraction of what the Innovation Center has cost to run. The Congressional Budget Office -- Congress's own official scorekeeper for the budgetary effects of legislation -- estimated that the center spent $7.9 billion operating models from 2011 through 2020, and that those models reduced federal health spending by $2.6 billion over the same period. Net that out and the program didn't save money at all: it added $5.4 billion to federal spending, the opposite of what the 2010 law built it to do. has since projected a further $1.3 billion increase from 2021 through 2030. Even if every dollar the four expanded models saved during their own testing periods is added up -- $2.3 billion combined, from the three that report a program-total figure -- that sum covers less than half of what says the whole 70-model effort cost in net spending over roughly the same stretch.
View data as table
| Combined Savings, 4 Expanded Models | 2,333,000,000 | Pioneer ACO ($384M) + Ambulance Prior Auth ($1B) + Home Health VBP ($949M); excludes the Diabetes Prevention Program's per-beneficiary figure |
|---|---|---|
| CBO's Net Spending Increase, All 70 Models | 5,400,000,000 | CBO found the Innovation Center raised federal spending by this much, FY2011-2020 -- not the savings PPACA built it to produce |
Why voluntary tests struggle to save money
The Innovation Center's own analysis names three reasons its models struggle to produce savings, and all three trace back to one design choice: 22 of its 24 active models let participants choose whether to join. Voluntary models need generous incentive payments to attract participants, which eats into any savings. They invite selection bias -- providers tend to join only when they already expect to come out ahead. And they suffer from attrition: participants facing possible losses often quit before a model gets the chance to prove it works. Among the 18 completed models with final evaluations, attrition among participating health care organizations ranged from zero all the way up to 78%. has responded by planning to test more mandatory models: only two of the 24 models active in January 2025 required participation, but the mandatory Increasing Organ Transplant Access Model began testing in July 2025, the mandatory Transforming Episode Accountability Model followed in January 2026, and a mandatory Ambulatory Specialty Model is planned for January 2027.
The money being spent is also shifting away from the models themselves. In fiscal year 2015, 82% of the center's $1.3 billion in annual obligations went to model-specific work -- contracts to implement, monitor, or evaluate a given model. By fiscal year 2024, that share had fallen to 54% of a much smaller $789 million budget, while the combined share going to shared administrative overhead and cross-model support functions grew from about 18% to nearly 46%. attributes the shift to consolidating IT and other common functions across models for efficiency; whatever the cause, close to half of what the program now spends each year isn't going toward testing a specific idea.
has also said, in its own 2024 report to Congress, that it has never expanded a model primarily because it improved care quality -- only because it didn't raise spending -- and that it's developing a new strategy to change that, with no date attached to when that strategy takes effect. Its own newly adopted 2026 performance target for the share of measures across its models that are outcome-based, rather than process-based, is 53%, just one point above the 52% baseline it started from in 2025. Meanwhile, $8.0 billion of the $20 billion Congress dedicated to this program remains unobligated, available through the second decade's appropriation, which runs through fiscal year 2029.
- 4 of 70 tested models -- 5.7% -- have ever become permanent, nationwide policy, the outcome 's own statutory bar (a 90-95% actuarial confidence of not raising spending) is built to be hard to clear.
- 's own math says the whole program cost taxpayers more, not less: estimated $7.9 billion spent operating models against $2.6 billion in savings realized, for a net spending increase it puts at $5.4 billion from 2011 to 2020 (the components are independently rounded) -- the opposite of the center's 2010 statutory mission.
- The share of money going to overhead, not model testing, nearly tripled: administrative and cross-model support obligations rose from about 18% of the budget in FY2015 to nearly 46% in FY2024, even as the total budget shrank by 40%.
This piece compares figures drawn from different, overlapping windows, and keeps them separate rather than netting them into one number. The $2.3 billion combined savings figure sums three expanded models' own testing-period totals (each model's testing window differs: 2012-2016, 2014-2020, and 2016-2020); 's $5.4 billion net-increase figure is a single estimate for the Innovation Center's entire 70-model portfolio across a fixed FY2011-2020 window. The comparison in this piece illustrates scale -- what the winners saved is a fraction of what says the whole effort cost -- not a literal subtraction of one figure from the other. Separately, the $1.6 trillion total federal Medicare/Medicaid/ spending figure cited for context is a single-year (FY2025) projection, not a historical baseline matching the FY2011-2020 analysis; it is included only to show the Innovation Center's obligations are a small share (about 0.7%) of the systems it was built to make more efficient.
issued no formal recommendations in this report -- it's a descriptive update to 's 2012 and 2018 prior work on the Innovation Center, not a findings-and-recommendations audit. reviewed a draft and provided only technical comments, which says it incorporated as appropriate. There is, as a result, no open recommendation to track here, unlike many reports -- the accountability this piece describes runs through 's own statutory mandate and 's independent budget scoring, not a recommendation has agreed or declined to implement.
Sources(1) ▾
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, CMS Innovation Center: Obligations and Model Testing Progress (GAO-26-107953) (2026-03-27) — 's March 27, 2026 report to the House Budget Committee chairman -- the sole evidentiary basis for this piece. Source for the Innovation Center's statutory mandate and appropriations (pp. 1-2), the $11.4 billion obligated FY2011-2024 and its year-by-year, category-by-category breakdown (pp. 10-12), the 70 models tested and their active/concluded split (p. 13), the four models certified for nationwide expansion and their testing-period savings (pp. 19-20, Table 4), 's own statement that it has never expanded a model primarily on quality grounds (p. 20), the successor-model pipeline (p. 21), the three factors itself has identified as limiting voluntary models' savings potential plus the participant-attrition data (pp. 22-23), the Innovation Center's May 2025 long-term goals and near-term performance targets (pp. 25-26, Table 5), and the report's own citation of the Congressional Budget Office's September 2023 finding that the Innovation Center increased net federal spending (p. 2, footnote 5). issued no formal recommendations in this report -- it is a descriptive update to 's 2012 and 2018 prior work, not a findings-and-recommendations audit; provided only technical comments (p. 27, Agency Comments). gao.gov · original document
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In 2010, the Affordable Care Act created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation -- a unit inside , the federal agency that runs Medicare and Medicaid -- and gave it one statutory job: test new ways of paying for care that reduce federal health spending as well as improve quality of care for beneficiaries⧉. Fifteen years and $11.4 billion later, GAO⧉ -- Congress's own independent auditor, whose findings agencies are expected to answer -- reports that the center has tested 70 of these payment models and certified just four of them, a 5.7% hit rate, for permanent, nationwide use. The Congressional Budget Office's own check on the entire program, cited in GAO's report⧉, found it did the opposite of its job: net federal spending rose by $5.4 billion from 2011 through 2020, not down.