HUD Finally Checked Every Rental Payment. $5.8 Billion Failed.
Summary
For eight straight years, HUD could not certify how much of the roughly $50 billion it pays landlords and housing authorities each year was reaching the right people. In fiscal year 2025, for the first time, HUD's own finance office checked every FY2024 payment instead of a small sample and flagged $5.8 billion as questionable -- more than a quarter of one program's spending, 30,054 dead tenants still on the rolls, and a first-ever citizenship review that turned up thousands of potentially ineligible non-citizens still receiving aid.
Two programs, one unmeasured risk
Tenant-Based Rental Assistance (TBRA) is the Section 8 voucher program most people picture -- a local housing authority hands a family a voucher, the family finds a private landlord, and reimburses the difference between the rent and what the tenant can afford. Project-Based Rental Assistance (PBRA) works the other way: contracts directly with a building owner to keep specific units affordable, and pays the landlord or contract administrator on the building's behalf, not the tenant. Together the two programs made up more than $16 billion (PBRA) and over $33 billion (TBRA)⧉ of 's roughly $50.4 billion in FY2024 rental spending -- about two-thirds of everything the department disburses in a year. Both rely on local housing authorities, landlords, and contract administrators -- not itself -- to verify that each tenant still qualifies, which is exactly the layer 's own checks have failed to reach for nearly a decade.
View data as table
| Project-Based Rental Assistance (PBRA) | 26.4% | About $4.3 billion of PBRA's roughly $16 billion in FY2024 payments |
|---|---|---|
| Tenant-Based Rental Assistance (TBRA) | 4.4% | About $1.5 billion of TBRA's roughly $33 billion in FY2024 payments |
What the full check found: dead tenants, non-citizens, and a program failing six times worse than its counterpart
For the first time, evaluated all four-plus million tenant records and the registration status of more than 21,000 recipient organizations, rather than the traditional sample of just a few hundred records 's finance office had relied on in prior years. The review flagged eligibility issues affecting more than 200,000 tenants⧉ and $5.8 billion in questionable payments overall -- but the two programs failed at very different rates: 26.4% of PBRA payments (about $4.3 billion) versus 4.4% of TBRA payments (about $1.5 billion), a gap 's report does not explain but that tracks with PBRA's dependence on landlords and contract administrators, an extra layer removed from the tenant, to self-report eligibility accurately.
Separately, matched its rental-assistance rolls against a Treasury death-records database for the first time and identified 30,054 tenants who were either still actively enrolled or had received a payment after they died. And in its first-ever collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security, ran 8.8 million tenant records through a citizenship check; 8.6 million came back confirmed as citizens or eligible non-citizens, but the agency says the remainder indicates that thousands of ineligible non-citizens are potentially still receiving assistance.
View data as table
| Total FY2024 rental assistance disbursed | 50,400,000,000 | PBRA and TBRA combined, paid to housing authorities, contract administrators, and landlords |
|---|---|---|
| Flagged questionable in HUD's review | 5,800,000,000 | First full-population check of every payment, not a sample |
Why the check didn't run for eight years
doesn't just require agencies to estimate improper payments -- it separately requires them to use the Treasury Department's Do Not Pay Initiative, a prepayment screening tool that checks a recipient against databases of the deceased, debarred contractors, and entities without an active federal registration, before money goes out the door. 's Office of Inspector General found had not been complying with that requirement either: the computer matching agreement⧉ that legally permits to query Treasury's Do Not Pay databases expired in 2019 and, as of the 's May 2025 audit, still had not been renewed.
In a narrower live test, auditors found 11 of 24 entities flagged for expired federal registration were still unregistered as of February 2025 -- having collected about $212 million after their registrations lapsed. reestablished the matching agreement with Treasury on May 1, 2025, and says it is now working toward near-real-time verification through the Do Not Pay portal.
What HUD says it's fixing, and what auditors say is still owed
's newest response is Project Voucher, a planned web portal meant to collect tenant eligibility documentation directly, trace payments to individual tenants, and automate the rent calculations local housing authorities currently do by hand. A separate internal group, the OCFO Strike Force, opened reviews of 23 public housing agencies and made five law enforcement referrals during 2025. Neither initiative resolves the underlying audit finding.
's Office of Inspector General has two priority recommendations still open -- one, from a January 2024 management alert, ordering 's Deputy Secretary to build a detailed plan and timeline for testing and reporting compliant improper-payment estimates in TBRA and PBRA; the other, dating to 2023, ordering the Chief Financial Officer to stand up a senior-level council to coordinate compliance across 's offices. As of the 's most recent audit, has not proposed an acceptable management decision on either one, so neither carries a target date. The last time did produce a compliant improper-payment estimate for these two programs, in 2016, it reported about $1.7 billion in improper payments combined -- a fraction of the $5.8 billion this year's first full look turned up, on spending that has grown substantially in the years between.
- ran a full-population check on its rental-aid payments for the first time in FY2025, replacing the small, few-hundred-record sample 's finance office had relied on in prior years, and flagged $5.8 billion of $50.4 billion in FY2024 payments -- about 11.5% -- as questionable.
- The two programs failed at very different rates: 26.4% of Project-Based Rental Assistance payments (paid to landlords and contract administrators) versus 4.4% of Tenant-Based Rental Assistance payments (paid through housing-authority vouchers).
- The review found 30,054 deceased tenants still enrolled or paid after death, and a first-ever citizenship cross-check that says indicates thousands of ineligible non-citizens are potentially still receiving assistance.
- The legally required prepayment check wasn't running: 's Treasury Do Not Pay computer matching agreement expired in 2019 and wasn't renewed until May 1, 2025 -- a separate, compounding failure alongside the eight straight years in which could not produce a -compliant improper-payment estimate for these two programs.
- Two priority recommendations remain open with no target date, because has not proposed a management decision auditors will accept -- one ordering a testing-and-reporting plan for TBRA/PBRA improper payments, the other ordering a senior-level compliance council.
"Questionable" is 's own data-analytics flag from its FY2025 review, not a confirmed determination of improper payment, fraud, or individual ineligibility -- 's report does not claim to have adjudicated each of the 200,000-plus flagged tenants, and some flagged payments may prove to have been correct once reviewed case by case. The $212 million Do Not Pay figure comes from a separate, narrower sample test (24 entities) inside the same audit and should not be added to the $5.8 billion full-population figure, which covers a different scope. Figures on the FY2024 full-population review, the deceased-tenant match, and the citizenship check are from 's FY2025 Agency Financial Report (December 18, 2025); figures on the 8-year/12-year noncompliance record, the lapsed Treasury matching agreement, and the open recommendations are from Report 2025-FO-0006 (May 13, 2025). Both were read directly in full.
Sources(2) ▾
- U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, HUD Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2025 (2025-12-18) — 's own annual financial report to Congress. Contains the Management's Discussion and Analysis section describing the OCFO's first-ever full-population data-analytics review of FY2024 rental assistance payments (p. 16-17), the Payment Integrity Information Act Reporting section with the $5.8 billion questionable-payment finding and its PBRA/TBRA breakdown (p. 170-172), the Project Voucher initiative description (p. 47-48), and, as Appendix I, 's own FY2026 Top Management and Performance Challenges report, which states the 8-year and 12-year noncompliance figures and the $212 million Do Not Pay finding (p. 159-161). Read directly, full text extracted. hud.gov · original document
- HUD Office of Inspector General, HUD Did Not Comply With the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (Report 2025-FO-0006) (2025-05-13) — 's independent audit of 's fiscal year 2024 compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act. Documents the eighth consecutive year could not produce a compliant improper-payment estimate for TBRA/PBRA, the twelfth consecutive year of overall noncompliance, the lapsed 2019 Treasury Do Not Pay computer matching agreement, the $212,208,450 paid to entities with expired SAM.gov registrations, and the status of open prior-year recommendations with no management decision or target date. Read directly via the oversight.gov mirror (hudoig.gov's own report pages return HTTP 403 to automated fetches), full text extracted. oversight.gov · original document
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The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 requires federal agencies to estimate, every year, how much of their spending in high-risk programs is improper -- paid to the wrong person, in the wrong amount, or without adequate documentation. For eight consecutive years, HUD's Office of Inspector General⧉ -- 's own independent internal watchdog -- has found unable to do that for its two largest and highest-risk programs, Tenant-Based and Project-Based Rental Assistance, together roughly $50 billion a year reaching more than four million households. In fiscal year 2025, 's finance office tried something different: instead of testing a small sample, it ran every FY2024 payment through automated analytics. What came back, in HUD's own year-end financial report⧉, was $5.8 billion in questionable payments -- more than one dollar in four in the larger of the two programs -- along with 30,054 dead tenants still on the rolls and thousands of potentially ineligible non-citizens the agency says it cannot yet rule out.