The Air Force wouldn't test its tanker camera. It still doesn't work.
Summary
The KC-46 Pegasus is meant to replace a third of the Air Force's aging aerial refueling tanker fleet, and its ability to refuel other aircraft in flight depends on a camera-and-display system called the remote vision system. Two GAO reports, about 4.4 years apart, show what happened after GAO flagged that system as a risk. In January 2022, GAO recommended the Air Force test the redesigned system operationally before committing to it -- and the Air Force refused, disagreeing with all three recommendations. In June 2026, GAO reported the predicted consequences: the program's full-rate production decision, delayed to September 2024 as of the 2022 report, still hadn't happened -- pushed instead to after September 2026 at the earliest, a 9-year slip from the original schedule -- with the same remote-vision-system and boom deficiencies GAO flagged in 2022 still open.
GAO's 2022 warning, and the Air Force's refusal
Two of the KC-46's critical deficiencies traced to the RVS, which couldn't handle changing lighting conditions well enough to perform every aerial refueling mission. found the Air Force planned to close its review of the contractor's proposed RVS redesign and take on financial responsibility for it without assessing the system's technology readiness, developing a plan to mature its immature components, or testing the prototype operationally. recommended all three steps. The Air Force disagreed with each one -- an unusual outcome, since agencies typically concur with 's recommendations even when they don't fully act on them. said at the time it continued to believe the recommendations were valid.
The bet the Air Force made
Rather than pause, the Air Force kept buying aircraft. Under its own 2022-era plans, the service expected to procure 118 of the KC-46 program's 175 total production aircraft -- about 67% of the fleet -- before testing on the RVS and boom fixes was even complete. The full-rate production decision, the program's next major milestone, had already slipped from October 2020 to at least September 2024, a nearly 4-year delay tied directly to the RVS and boom problems. Acquisition costs climbed from $43 billion to $44 billion between January 2019 and December 2020, though the program remained under its original $51.7 billion estimate.
View data as table
| Total planned production aircraft | 175 |
|---|---|
| Procured before RVS/boom testing complete (by end of FY2024) | 118 |
Four years later: still broken, further behind
's June 2026 report confirms the September 2024 target didn't hold either. Citing its own June 2025 findings, now says the full-rate production decision isn't expected until after September 2026 at the earliest -- the target date has moved back at least 2 more years since 2022. frames that as about a 9-year delay from the program's original schedule -- a larger figure than the 4-year delay reported in 2022, though the two numbers aren't directly comparable, since the 2022 figure was measured from the program's October 2020 baseline update rather than its original schedule. As of February 2026, Air Force officials still reported one open critical deficiency on the refueling boom and two on the remote vision system -- the same subsystems at the center of 's rejected 2022 recommendations.
View data as table
| GAO's 2022 report: delay from the 2020 rebaseline | 4 |
|---|---|
| GAO's 2026 report: delay from the original schedule | 9 |
Meanwhile, the whole fleet is stretched thin
The KC-46's troubles are playing out against a fleet with little room to spare. From fiscal 2019 through fiscal 2025, the Air Force divested all 59 of its KC-10 tankers, retired 21 KC-135s, and fielded 84 new KC-46As -- a net gain of just 4 aircraft. As of early March 2026, the fleet stood at 476 tankers (373 KC-135s and 103 KC-46As), only 10 above the 466-aircraft minimum requirement. And that fleet hasn't met the Air Force's own availability and capability standards in any of the last seven fiscal years, 2019 through 2025 -- though the specific annual rates were withheld from the public report as sensitive information.
View data as table
| Minimum required | 466 |
|---|---|
| Actual, March 2026 | 476 |
also documented sustainment strain across both aircraft types: shortages of critical avionics parts for the KC-135 and auxiliary power units for the KC-46A, a maintenance workforce where one base reported full staffing but roughly three-quarters of maintainers lacking necessary experience, and infrastructure gaps that required building 17 new hangars at Tinker Air Force Base alone. made four recommendations this time -- focused, refueling-specific readiness metrics; regular reporting on them; a comprehensive sustainment-risk assessment; and a mitigation plan based on it. The Air Force concurred with all four.
The takeaway
- 's rejected 2022 warning held up. The Air Force disagreed with all three recommendations to test the KC-46's redesigned camera system before committing to it; four years later, that same system still has two open critical deficiencies.
- The schedule kept slipping past the point had already flagged. A production decision reported delayed to September 2024 in 2022 is now, per 's 2026 report, not expected before September 2026 -- a 9-year delay from the original schedule.
- The fleet built around this troubled aircraft has almost no margin. At 476 tankers against a 466-aircraft minimum, and after missing its own readiness standards in all of the last seven fiscal years, the Air Force's aerial refueling fleet has little slack left to absorb further delays.
Findings on the KC-46's remote vision system risk, the Air Force's non-concurrence, and the program's 2022-era cost and schedule are from -22-104530, 'KC-46 Tanker: Air Force Needs to Mature Critical Technologies in New Aerial Refueling System Design' (January 27, 2022), read directly in full via an archived copy after the current gao.gov asset URL blocked direct access. Findings on the fleet's current composition, the further schedule slip, and sustainment risks are from -26-109154, 'Aerial Refueling Tankers: Air Force Needs More Focused Metrics and a Risk-Based Mitigation Plan to Improve Sustainment' (June 10, 2026), also read directly in full; this is a public version of a sensitive May 2026 report, with some KC-135/KC-46A mission-capable rate data withheld as Controlled Unclassified Information. The two reports examine the same aircraft program about 4.4 years apart -- the first warning of a specific technology risk the Air Force chose to accept, the second confirming how that bet turned out. Note on the two delay figures cited above: 's 2022 report measures its 4-year delay from the program's October 2020 baseline update, while 's 2026 report measures its 9-year delay from the program's original schedule -- different reference points, so the two figures are not directly additive.
Sources(2) ▾
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, KC-46 Tanker: Air Force Needs to Mature Critical Technologies in New Aerial Refueling System Design (2022-01-27) — -22-104530, a report to congressional addressees warning that the Air Force planned to accept financial responsibility for a redesigned KC-46 remote vision system without first assessing its technology readiness, developing a maturation plan, or operationally testing it -- the technology-risk-warning facet. Distinct from doc-gao26-109154 (the fleet-sustainment-outcomes facet, published about 4.4 years later, confirming the predicted slippage). Direct gao.gov PDF fetch returns HTTP 403; fetched via an existing Wayback capture. gao.gov · original document
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aerial Refueling Tankers: Air Force Needs More Focused Metrics and a Risk-Based Mitigation Plan to Improve Sustainment (2026-06-10) — -26-109154, a public version of a sensitive May 2026 report to the House Armed Services Committee (some KC-135/KC-46A mission-capable rate data omitted as Controlled Unclassified Information), examining aerial refueling tanker fleet composition, metrics, and sustainment risk about 4.4 years after doc-gao22-104530's technology-risk warning. Fetched directly from files.gao.gov (HTTP 200); direct gao.gov PDF asset returns HTTP 403. gao.gov · original document
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The KC-46 Pegasus is meant to replace a third of the Air Force's aging aerial refueling tanker fleet, and refueling other aircraft in flight depends on its remote vision system (RVS) -- the cameras and display that let an operator guide the fuel boom into position. In January 2022⧉, warned the Air Force was about to accept financial responsibility for a redesigned RVS without properly testing it first. In June 2026⧉ -- about 4.4 years later -- reported on what came of that decision, and the rest of the tanker fleet along with it.