Almost all Lifeline dead-subscriber claims ran through three states
Summary
A January 2026 FCC Inspector General advisory and a May 2025 statutory compliance audit -- one an investigation into specific fraud, one a program-wide accounting of improper payments -- describe the same underlying machine breaking down in two different ways. The Lifeline program lets three states substitute their own enrollment checks for the FCC's standard system; providers in those states claimed subsidies for 116,808 deceased subscribers over nearly five years. Separately, the program's official improper-payment rate nearly tripled in a single year, and FCC's own auditors traced 80 percent of it to a cause entirely within the agency's control.
How the death-check gap works
NLAD, the national enrollment database, was built in 2013-2014 specifically to catch duplicate and ineligible sign-ups; when the layered on a separate eligibility-verification system (the National Verifier) in 2018-2019, it again let the opt-out states keep using their own processes. The result is a parallel enrollment pipeline for California, Texas, and Oregon that the 's central death-matching and duplicate-detection tools never see. does run a second-line check -- a monthly death screen applied to all subscribers, opt-out states included, before it reimburses providers -- but that backstop is where most of the failures below were caught, after the fact, rather than prevented at enrollment. has since revoked California's opt-out status.
View data as table
| California | 94,596 |
|---|---|
| Texas | 20,350 |
| Oregon | 2,220 |
California accounts for 81 percent of the 116,808 deceased subscribers identified, a matching exercise it ran against Treasury's Do Not Pay database. Two-thirds of those subscribers, 77,446, died after they were already enrolled -- an unavoidable timing gap in any subsidy program. But at least 16,774 were enrolled and claimed by a provider only after they had already died, and providers kept billing for them anyway, for an average of 3.4 months, collecting more than $500,000. For the remaining 22,588, couldn't determine which came first, because the opt-out states don't report enrollment dates to at all -- providers billed this group for an average of 8.5 months after death, worth about $1.5 million.
The backstop is missing people too
's monthly reimbursement death-check has caught a lot: calculates it blocked 1.3 million enrollment and reimbursement attempts for dead people between 2018 and 2024, preventing an estimated $29 million to $137 million in improper payments. But 's new analysis shows it's still missing people in real time -- in September 2025 alone, providers sought and were paid for more than 11,000 deceased opt-out-state subscribers, over 5,500 of whom had died before they were ever enrolled. has pursued individual cases before: in 2022, a Lifeline provider responsible for more than 23,000 deceased enrollments repaid over $16.5 million and entered a three-year compliance plan under a False Claims Act settlement. also found more than 270,000 instances since December 2020 where the same subscriber -- matched on name, birthdate, and partial Social Security number -- was billed twice in one month, some in two opt-out states at once and some split between an opt-out state and an NLAD state, worth nearly $5.5 million.
The program-wide numbers tell a parallel story
The opt-out-state fraud investigated is one slice of a larger pattern. Under a separate federal law, an independent auditor examines 's improper-payment rate across its highest-risk programs every year. That audit, covering all Lifeline claims nationwide (not just the opt-out states), found the program's improper-payment rate jumped from 2.18 percent in fiscal 2023 to 5.98 percent in fiscal 2024 -- missing 's own 2.10 percent reduction target so badly that 's response was to raise next year's target to 4.70 percent rather than hold the line. A sister program, the Universal Service Fund's High-Cost Legacy subsidy for rural carriers, moved the same direction: 2.88 percent to 4.45 percent, also missing its target.
View data as table
| USF-Lifeline, FY2023 | 2.2 |
|---|---|
| USF-Lifeline, FY2024 | 6 |
| USF-High-Cost Legacy, FY2023 | 2.9 |
| USF-High-Cost Legacy, FY2024 | 4.5 |
What makes Lifeline's jump notable is where the auditors traced it. Of the $46.9 million in improper payments reported for fiscal 2024, $37.8 million -- 80 percent -- was attributed to inaccurate manual eligibility reviews performed by 's own review staff, not to fraud by outside providers or applicants. That exact failure mode also drove $10.4 million in errors the year before; it more than tripled. The fix had planned -- mandatory retraining for the reviewers -- wasn't actually delivered until July 2024, ten months into the fiscal year it was supposed to fix, and never ran a cost-benefit analysis of what else might work faster.
View data as table
| Inaccurate manual eligibility reviews (agency-controlled) | 37.8 |
|---|---|
| All other causes | 9.1 |
The High-Cost Legacy program's failure looked different but landed in the same place: of its $81.75 million in improper payments, $80.26 million -- 98 percent -- went to carriers whose supporting financial paperwork either didn't match what auditors could verify ($42.60 million, the same documentation problem the prior year's audit had already flagged) or wasn't submitted at all ($37.66 million, a newly identified root cause for FY2024). The auditors also found 's own improper-payment reporting had errors of its own: a months-long double-count in one data feed, an overreported figure for one program of $890,000, and a combined $1.14 million underreported across two others -- all submitted to the government's public payment-accuracy website.
What's been recommended
's recommendations center on closing the information gap between the opt-out states and the national system: require those states to share enrollment and transfer data with NLAD and the National Verifier, register their sales agents in the 's tracking database, and collect full Social Security numbers from applicants -- a recommendation first made in 2016. The compliance auditors' recommendations are narrower and program-specific: a cost-benefit analysis of new eligibility-review tools for Lifeline, and a root-cause analysis, more frequent monitoring, and a phased reduction-target plan for the High-Cost Legacy program.
The takeaway
- The gap is structural, not incidental. Three states were allowed to substitute their own enrollment systems for the 's national death-check and duplicate-detection database, and 81% of the 116,808 deceased subscribers identified since 2020 came from just one of them, California.
- The backstop still misses people in real time. Even after preventing an estimated 1.3 million improper enrollment attempts since 2018, 's monthly reimbursement death-check missed more than 11,000 deceased subscribers in September 2025 alone -- more than 5,500 of whom had died before they were ever enrolled.
- Most of the money isn't lost to clever fraud -- it's lost to process errors, some old and some new. 's own auditors traced 80% of Lifeline's $46.9 million in FY2024 improper payments to a review-process failure already flagged the year before, and 98% of a sister program's $81.75 million to carrier documentation failures -- about half of it a repeat of a previously flagged cause, the rest newly identified this year.
The scale, geography, and mechanics of deceased and duplicate opt-out-state enrollments are from the Office of Inspector General's 'Advisory Regarding Deceased and Duplicate Lifeline Subscribers' (January 2026), read directly and in full. -Lifeline's and -High-Cost Legacy's improper-payment rates, root-cause findings, and reduction targets are from Kearney & Company's 'Audit of the Federal Communications Commission's Fiscal Year 2024 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019' (Audit Report 25-AUD-01-01, May 27, 2025), also read directly and in full. The advisory cites the compliance audit directly for the 2.18%-to-5.98% improper-payment-rate figure; beyond that citation, the two reports examine different scopes of the same program -- one a targeted fraud investigation in three states, one a program-wide statutory rate audit -- and were not otherwise cross-referenced by their authors.
Sources(2) ▾
- Federal Communications Commission Office of Inspector General, FCC OIG Advisory Regarding Deceased and Duplicate Lifeline Subscribers (2026-01-01) — advisory dated January 2026, based on a data-matching initiative with Treasury's Do Not Pay program. Read in full directly from the PDF via the Wayback mirror (direct fcc.gov fetch was unreachable). fcc.gov · original document
- Kearney & Company, P.C., under contract to the FCC Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Communications Commission's Fiscal Year 2024 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (2025-05-27) — Audit Report Number 25-AUD-01-01, a statutorily required annual performance audit conducted by Kearney & Company under contract to . Read in full directly from the PDF, mirrored on oversight.gov (HTTP 200, no Wayback capture needed). oversight.gov · original document
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The 's Lifeline program subsidizes phone and internet service for low-income households, administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company (). Since 2013, has run a national database, NLAD, that checks new enrollees against death records and screens out duplicate sign-ups. Three states -- California, Texas, and Oregon -- were allowed to opt out and use their own systems instead. A January 2026 FCC Inspector General advisory⧉ found that between December 2020 and September 2025, providers in those three states claimed Lifeline subsidies for 116,808 deceased subscribers, worth nearly $5 million. Separately, FCC's own compliance audit⧉, released in May 2025, found the program's improper-payment rate rose from 2.18 percent in fiscal 2023 to 5.98 percent in fiscal 2024 -- and 's own analysis traced 80 percent of that year's $46.9 million in improper payments to a cause fully within the agency's control.