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Maryland's Department of General Services -- Office of State Procurement, and its eMaryland Marketplace Advantage (eMMA) system, reviewed by the state's independent Office of Legislative Audits

Maryland Paid $32.5 Million for a Procurement System That Failed

Summary

A Maryland legislative audit found the state's Office of State Procurement paid a vendor $32.5 million -- 85% of a $38.2 million, 10-year contract -- for a system that never properly connected to the state's own accounting records and mostly functions as a bid board. OSP fired the vendor in June 2025; as of the audit's October 2025 cutoff, it had not assessed the liquidated damages its contract allowed, and it signed $25.5 million in new contracts just to build what it had already paid for. A separate finding in the same audit describes a senior OSP employee routing invoices through a Minority Business Enterprise subcontractor that, investigators found, had not performed any of the work it was billing for.

By Frontinus · July 18, 2026

Maryland's Department of General Services runs the centralized purchasing for most state agencies -- about $2.1 billion in procurements in fiscal year 2024 alone. In 2019, the Board of Public Works approved a 10-year, $38.2 million contract to build a new eProcurement system, eMaryland Marketplace Advantage (eMMA), meant to finally give the state a single platform for bidding, contracting, and payment. A fiscal compliance audit released in December 2025 by Maryland's Office of Legislative Audits found that six years into that contract, the state had paid the vendor $32.5 million -- 85% of the total -- for a system that still can't properly interface with Maryland's own accounting records, and that today "primarily functions as a bid board."

A system that couldn't reconcile with the state's own books

The integration eMMA was supposed to deliver -- a direct link to the state's Financial Management Information System (FMIS) -- was the same feature that had already failed in the prior version of the system a decade earlier. It failed again. Auditors traced FMIS expenditures for the four pilot agencies that began using eMMA in November 2022 and found that roughly 1,100 purchase orders, worth $35.6 million, couldn't be matched to any purchase order in eMMA at all -- because the system changed FMIS purchase-order numbers whenever an order closed. Unable to track its own outstanding balances, the state had to hire an outside accounting firm to reconstruct them; as of September 2025, that cleanup had cost $1.6 million. The same firm's review turned up roughly 2,100 invoices that eMMA had cancelled after the state had already paid them through FMIS -- payments OSP still had not investigated as of May 2025.

Paid for eMMA
$32.5M
85% of a $38.2 million, 10-year contract -- for a system that still can't talk to the state's own accounting records
Recovered after firing the vendor
$0
as of the audit's October 2025 cutoff, OSP had not assessed the liquidated damages its contract allowed, or pursued recovery for the deficient work
New contracts to finish the job
$25.5M
$19.8M for a replacement system integrator plus $5.7M for the platform provider -- on top of the $32.5M already spent
What Maryland has paid for a procurement system it had to fire
The original eMMA contract paid to date, plus what OSP has since had to spend to reconcile the mess and replace the vendor
Original eMMA contract, paid to date
32,500,000
Outside accounting firm to reconcile books
1,600,000
New system-integrator contract
19,800,000
New platform-provider contract
5,700,000
Source: Maryland Office of Legislative Audits, Report OSP25, pp.10-11
View data as table
OSP paid $32.5 million of a $38.2 million, 10-year contract for a system that primarily works as a bid board. After firing the vendor in June 2025, it signed $25.5 million in new contracts to build the integration eMMA was supposed to deliver in the first place -- on top of $1.6 million already spent hiring outside accountants just to figure out what it actually owed.
Original eMMA contract, paid to date32,500,000
Outside accounting firm to reconcile books1,600,000
New system-integrator contract19,800,000
New platform-provider contract5,700,000

Paying for deliverables that didn't work -- and never checking again

OSP's own internal review in July 2022 had already caught this pattern: it identified about $740,000 paid for deliverables later found deficient, including $202,600 for a single deliverable that was never validated or deployed at all. But OSP never went back to check the work that followed. As of May 2025, $26.7 million in payments for work performed after that July 2022 review had never been reviewed for the same problem. When auditors tested a small sample themselves, they found it too: of $2.3 million in tested invoices, $719,700 lacked the signed timesheets the contract required, and two invoices worth $499,100 billed $382,700 for labor rates and job categories that were never part of the contract -- including $33,600 for a "Software Test Manager" role that didn't exist in it.

OSP terminated the vendor's contract in June 2025. Even though the contract allowed liquidated damages for missed delivery dates, auditors found OSP had never assessed any, and had instead simply pushed delivery deadlines back rather than penalize the vendor. As of the audit's October 2025 cutoff, OSP had not attempted to recover a dollar of the failed work, though auditors recommended it still pursue recovery. To finish what the original contract was supposed to build, the state signed a $19.8 million contract with a new system integrator in May 2025, plus a separate $5.7 million contract with the platform provider -- $25.5 million in new spending layered on top of the $32.5 million already gone.

Share of tested eMMA invoices that shouldn't have been paid as billed
Three separate samples of eMMA vendor invoices, and the share of each sample's dollar value auditors flagged
Missing required signed timesheets (of $2.3M tested)
31.3%
Billed for labor rates never in the contract (of $499K tested)
76.7%
MBE-routed administrative-fee markup (of $215K tested)
27.7%
Source: Maryland Office of Legislative Audits, Report OSP25, pp.11, 13
View data as table
Every small sample of eMMA invoices auditors actually tested came back tainted -- from missing timesheets to labor rates the contract never authorized to administrative fees layered on through a subcontractor who, investigators found, hadn't done any of the work.
Missing required signed timesheets (of $2.3M tested)31.3%
Billed for labor rates never in the contract (of $499K tested)76.7%
MBE-routed administrative-fee markup (of $215K tested)27.7%

A minority-business subcontractor that did no work

The eMMA contract set a 10% Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) participation goal, with a specific subcontractor designated to perform that share -- by February 2025, OSP had paid the vendor $3.6 million for services billed under that arrangement. Auditors found that between April and December 2023, a senior OSP management employee directed the eMMA vendor to route invoices from several non-MBE subcontractors through the MBE subcontractor instead. When DGS investigated in December 2023, it determined the MBE subcontractor had done no work on the contract other than passing along payments and billing for them. OSP fired the employee and referred the matter to the Attorney General's office -- but kept paying the vendor for the MBE subcontractor's ostensible services for another year and a half, until the whole contract was terminated in June 2025.

The arrangement inflated costs: in a sample of four invoices worth $215,100, $59,600 -- 28% -- was pure administrative-fee markup, with one subcontractor's $82.50 hourly rate rewritten to $170 before it reached the state. The same audit separately found OSP failed to collect at least $2 million in administrative fees -- concentrated in just 2 of roughly seven other eMMA contracts tested, which omitted the required fee clause entirely and together covered $199 million in statewide payments -- a problem auditors say has gone uncorrected since December 2016.

  • Maryland's Office of State Procurement paid a vendor $32.5 million -- 85% of a $38.2 million, 10-year contract -- for a procurement system, eMMA, that still can't properly interface with the state's own accounting records and mostly functions as a bid board.
  • $26.7 million in payments for work performed after an internal 2022 review had already caught the same deficiency problem was never reviewed at all; a small sample auditors tested themselves found unsigned timesheets and $382,700 billed for labor rates never in the contract.
  • OSP terminated the contract in June 2025 without, as of the audit's October 2025 cutoff, assessing the liquidated damages it was owed, then signed $25.5 million in new contracts -- $19.8 million plus $5.7 million -- just to build the integration the original contract had already been paid to deliver.
  • A senior OSP employee routed invoices through a Minority Business Enterprise subcontractor that investigators found had performed no actual work, adding markups as high as 106% before OSP fired the employee -- but kept paying the arrangement for another 18 months.

All figures come from the Maryland Office of Legislative Audits' fiscal compliance audit of the Department of General Services -- Office of State Procurement (Report OSP25, issued December 19, 2025), covering November 1, 2021 through January 31, 2025, and DGS's own written response appended to the report. This piece independently recomputed the $32.5 million payment as a share of the $38.2 million contract (85%, matching the audit's own figure), the combined cost of the two replacement contracts ($25.5 million), the total incremental cost beyond the original $32.5 million payment ($27.1 million, covering only the outside accounting firm and the two replacement contracts -- not every dollar the audit separately flags as unsupported), and the failure rates within each of the three invoice-testing samples the audit describes (31%, 77%, and 28%); all reproduce or are directly derived from the report's own figures. As of the audit's own cutoff dates (May-October 2025), OSP had not yet reviewed the $26.7 million in post-2022 payments, assessed liquidated damages, or pursued recovery, though auditors recommended it do so. DGS agreed with the audit's recommendations but disputed its characterization that the system "did not function as intended"; auditors reaffirmed the finding in a published comment.

Sources(1) ▾
  • Maryland General Assembly, Department of Legislative Services, Office of Legislative Audits (Brian S. Tanen, CPA, CFE, Legislative Auditor), Audit Report: Department of General Services -- Office of State Procurement (Report OSP25) (2025-12-19)Maryland's independent legislative fiscal-compliance audit of the Department of General Services' Office of State Procurement (OSP), covering November 1, 2021 through January 31, 2025. Source for every dollar figure, percentage, and quote in this piece describing the eMaryland Marketplace Advantage (eMMA) contract failure, the Minority Business Enterprise subcontractor scheme, and OSP's uncollected administrative fees, including DGS's own written response (Agency Response Form) agreeing to the recommendations and the auditors' rebuttal comment on DGS's characterization dispute. dls.maryland.gov · original document
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