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City of Rocky Mount, North Carolina -- municipal finance and governance

Rocky Mount Burned 78% of Its Reserves, Then Cut 86 Jobs

Summary

North Carolina's Office of the State Auditor -- the constitutional office that investigates local-government finances statewide -- opened a review of Rocky Mount after "a series of inquiries, tips, and concerns." What its performance audit found: the city's combined cash and investments balance collapsed from $100.7 million to $21.8 million in two years -- a 78% decline -- after Rocky Mount hired a city manager an executive search firm itself called a "stretch candidate," paid $38,000 to recruit him, and never checked his references. The city eliminated 86 jobs and raised utility bills to cope. Four months later, a follow-up information-systems audit found that two of the City Council members responsible for overseeing that recovery had let their own utility bills go unpaid for months.

By Locusta · July 16, 2026
Narration is synthetic. Every number sourced.

The North Carolina Office of the State Auditor -- the constitutional office that audits state agencies and, when tipped off, digs into local governments too -- opened a review of the City of Rocky Mount after what it describes only as "a series of inquiries, tips, and concerns." The result, released in March 2026: Rocky Mount's combined cash and investments balance fell from $100,716,009 in August 2023 to $21,759,176 in August 2025 -- a 78% collapse in two years, or about $78,956,833, equal to roughly $1,437 for every one of the city's 54,943 residents. The auditor's verdict is blunt -- "a combination of poor personnel decisions and egregious overspending" -- and the bill has already landed on residents: 86 city jobs eliminated, and utility rates raised to help close the gap.

A "stretch candidate," hired without a single reference check

Like most North Carolina municipalities, Rocky Mount runs on a council-manager system: an elected Mayor and seven-member Council set policy, but a single hired City Manager runs day-to-day operations, appoints department heads, and administers the budget -- meaning who holds that job matters as much as any single vote. In March 2023, the City Council unanimously hired a new City Manager after paying an executive search firm $38,000 to find him -- despite the firm itself describing him as a "stretch candidate." The audit found no evidence Rocky Mount ran a single reference check. Had it looked, it would have found that he'd previously served as Town Manager in Dumfries, Virginia, where he made unqualified hires, approved salary increases without council approval, and oversaw a $1 million budget overspend -- the same pattern he'd repeat in Rocky Mount. He served until August 2024, when he left with a $169,875 separation payment.

Cash & investments balance, 2 years
-78%
$100.7M (Aug. 2023) to $21.8M (Aug. 2025) -- about $79.0M drained from reserves
Full-time jobs eliminated
86
~10% of total City staff; 37 more employees resigned and 10 retired in the aftermath
Capital spending, FY2024
+153%
$26.6M to $67.4M in one year -- $40.8M more, anchored by land for a casino that never broke ground
Rocky Mount's reserves, before and after
Combined cash and investments balance, $ millions
Aug. 2019
113.3
Mar. 2023 (new City Manager hired)
124.7
Aug. 2023
100.7
Aug. 2025
21.8
Source: NC Office of the State Auditor, City of Rocky Mount Financial Distress (PER-2026-558), Figure 2
View data as table
Rocky Mount's combined cash and investments balance held near $113-125 million from 2019 through the hiring of a new City Manager in March 2023, then collapsed to $21.8 million by August 2025 -- a decline of about $79 million (78%) in two years, per the state auditor's own analysis of the City's Capital Management Trust account data.
Aug. 2019113.3
Mar. 2023 (new City Manager hired)124.7the peak, reached the month the former City Manager started
Aug. 2023100.7
Aug. 202521.8a 78% decline from Aug. 2023's balance in two years

Where the money went

Capital spending and related debt service jumped to $67.4 million in FY2024, a $40.8 million (153%) increase from FY2023's $26.6 million -- driven by purchases the audit says were made without a thorough feasibility analysis or full Council review. The largest: $17.2 million for 336 acres of land meant for a casino and entertainment complex that never materialized, financed on a 59-month term structured to avoid Local Government Commission review; the undeveloped land still carries a consultant on retainer at $10,000 a month to find tenants. A rebuild of Fire Station #2 ran to $11.2 million -- nearly three times its original estimate. A vehicle-fleet lease cost $6.8 million in a single lump sum, and $6.6 million more went to trucks, bulldozers, and a $341,000 armored SWAT vehicle that, per the audit, remains largely unused.

Four purchases, most of one year's overspending
Major capital commitments identified in the audit, $ millions (total cost, not limited to one fiscal year)
336-acre casino/entertainment land (never developed)
17.2
Fire Station #2 (~3x original estimate)
11.2
Light-vehicle fleet lease
6.8
Fire/garbage trucks, bulldozers, BearCat SWAT vehicle
6.6
Source: NC Office of the State Auditor, City of Rocky Mount Financial Distress (PER-2026-558), Capital Spending detail
View data as table
Four capital purchases the audit singles out as made without a thorough feasibility analysis or full City Council review: $17.2 million for land intended for a casino/entertainment complex that never materialized, $11.2 million for a fire station that ended up costing nearly three times its original estimate, a $6.8 million lump-sum vehicle-fleet lease, and $6.6 million in other equipment including a largely-unused $341,000 armored SWAT vehicle. Together they anchor FY2024's $40.8 million, 153% jump in capital spending.
336-acre casino/entertainment land (never developed)17.2
Fire Station #2 (~3x original estimate)11.2
Light-vehicle fleet lease6.8
Fire/garbage trucks, bulldozers, BearCat SWAT vehicle6.6includes $341,000 for a BearCat that remains largely unused

The raises no one fully approved

Personnel costs rose to $62.4 million in FY2025, a $13.5 million (27%) increase from FY2023 -- about 1.6 times what the entire FY2023 personnel budget had cost. Police salaries absorbed the largest single piece, up $4.7 million (47%), with starting pay raised to $60,000 -- 36% above the figure originally discussed with Council -- implemented, the audit found, without a full feasibility analysis, without Council approval, and without support from the City's own Compensation and Classification Study. Fire salaries rose $1.9 million (22%), and a citywide pay-grade adjustment added $3.2 million more, approved on only a partial presentation of that same compensation study -- the City's Budget Office had planned for a 3% cost-of-living raise; it delivered 12.6%.

Three raises, one without Council's sign-off
Personnel-cost increases identified in the audit, $ millions
Police salaries (+47%, no Council approval)
4.7
Citywide pay-grade adjustment
3.2
Fire Department salaries (+22%)
1.9
Source: NC Office of the State Auditor, City of Rocky Mount Financial Distress (PER-2026-558), Personnel Costs detail
View data as table
Three of the raises behind FY2025's $13.5 million personnel-cost increase: a $4.7 million (47%) police raise implemented without City Council approval or a funding-feasibility analysis, a $3.2 million citywide pay-grade adjustment approved on only a partial presentation of the City's own compensation study, and a $1.9 million (22%) fire raise.
Police salaries (+47%, no Council approval)4.7
Citywide pay-grade adjustment3.2
Fire Department salaries (+22%)1.9

No one was watching the books

An obligation is money the city has legally committed but not yet checked against reality; Rocky Mount's audit found the checking simply stopped. Since FY2021, the Finance Department cycled through five directors, some with little local-government finance experience, and the City went at least 13 months without performing bank reconciliations -- the basic monthly check that account balances actually match the bank's records. Fund balances fell below the City's own policy thresholds and the state's Local Government Commission minimums. Rather than enforce spending cuts when departments ran over budget -- overage that grew from $1.2 million in FY2023 to $10.3 million in FY2024, a 798% jump the audit itself calculated -- the City Council instead approved budget amendments after the fact to match what had already been spent, normalizing the overruns instead of stopping them. Separately, $71 million was moved out of the City's trust accounts into its operating funds, directly depleting the reserves the cash-balance chart above tracks.

Residents paid for it twice

In response to the crisis, Rocky Mount paused non-essential capital projects, cut its part-time staffing budget, and eliminated 86 full-time positions -- about 10% of total staff -- after which 37 more employees resigned and 10 retired. The City also raised property taxes and utility rates, adding an average of $20 a month to natural-gas bills and $8 a month to electric bills for a typical household. What Rocky Mount's own General Fund -- its core day-to-day budget for police, fire, parks, and general government -- spent in FY2024 was $104,874,547, just over a third of the $302,767,901 the City paid out that year once capital projects and debt service are counted in. It's that wider total, not routine operations, that the overspending detailed above actually drained.

The same city, still leaking control

In July 2026, four months after the financial-distress audit, a second State Auditor report examined a separate crisis: in late 2025, thousands of Rocky Mount's more than 31,000 utility customers received two bills in a single month. The cause traced back to the same governance failure -- unauthorized, undetected changes to the City's meter-reading and billing schedules, made in an environment the auditor says lacked basic change-management controls. Customers weren't actually double-charged, but the confusion exposed something else: two sitting City Council members, Charles "Verb" Roberson and T.J. Walker, had let their own utility bills go unpaid for months, accumulating $27,171.15 across 30 accounts and $3,060.13 on one account respectively -- $30,231.28 combined, some balances unpaid for up to 120 days, and not settled until the auditor sent the City a draft report asking about them.

That total is a rounding error against a $279 million operating budget, as the audit itself notes -- but it isn't the first time. In 2020, the same auditor's office found that previous city managers and a former Finance Director had blocked disconnection for nonpayment on a different Council member's account and ultimately wrote off $47,704 he owed. The recommendation this time is the same as the one running through the March audit: require a written, funded financial-impact analysis before major spending decisions, fill the Finance Director post competitively with a qualified candidate, and hold City Council itself to the account-payment rules it enforces on 31,000 ordinary ratepayers. None of that requires new legislation -- only that the people Rocky Mount elected, and the ones it hires, follow the rules already on the books.

  • A single hiring decision skipped basic due diligence. The City paid $38,000 to a search firm that itself flagged the eventual hire as a "stretch candidate" and ran no reference check -- one that would have surfaced his prior record as Town Manager in Dumfries, Virginia, where he'd made unqualified hires, approved salary increases without council approval, and overseen a $1 million budget overspend.
  • The $79 million did not vanish into one bad decision -- it leaked through a system with no working checks. Five finance directors in four years, 13 months without a bank reconciliation, a $71 million trust-to-operating transfer, and a City Council that amended budgets to match overspending instead of stopping it, together explain the collapse better than any single purchase does.
  • The people meant to catch this were themselves out of compliance. Two sitting Council members owed the City's own utility system a combined $30,231.28, some of it up to 120 days late, until an auditor's draft report forced payment -- echoing a nearly identical 2020 finding involving a different Council member.
  • Recovery depends on Rocky Mount actually adopting the controls the March audit recommended (moderate confidence): written financial-impact analyses before major spending and competitive, reference-checked executive recruitment are the fixes that audit prescribed for the failures above. The July follow-up audit adds its own separate finding: the current Council unpaid-bills problem is, in the auditor's own words, "similar to a 2020 finding" involving a different Council member -- evidence that Council-level accountability gaps have already gone unresolved once before, well before this audit cycle began.

The $100.7 million/$21.8 million cash-and-investments figures are the state auditor's own analysis of the City's combined Capital Management Trust account data (Appendix A of PER-2026-558), not the fund-balance figures reported separately in the City's audited financial statements, which follow different governmental-accounting rules and fund boundaries. Figures describing FY2023 (personnel and capital baseline costs) are backed out of the audit's own stated dollar and percentage increases and are approximate to the audit's own rounding. The per-capita and payroll-multiple comparisons in this piece are this publication's own arithmetic, not figures the auditor published directly. The former City Manager is not named in the state auditor's report and is not named here for that reason.

Sources(3) ▾
  • North Carolina Office of the State Auditor, City of Rocky Mount Financial Distress -- Performance Audit Report PER-2026-558 (2026-03-09)The state auditor's performance audit of the City of Rocky Mount, launched after 'a series of inquiries, tips, and concerns.' Covers FY2023-FY2025, tracing the City's combined cash-and-investments balance, personnel and capital spending growth, governance breakdowns (hiring, financial-leadership turnover, Council oversight), and the resulting job cuts and rate increases. Fetched directly as a PDF from auditor.nc.gov and read page-by-page. auditor.nc.gov · original document
  • North Carolina Office of the State Auditor, City of Rocky Mount Utilities Billing -- Information Systems Audit Report ISA-2026-558 (2026-07-08)A follow-on information-systems audit, opened after late-2025 double-billing complaints from over 31,000 utility customers. Traces the billing-schedule failure to unauthorized, undetected changes made without change-management controls, and separately documents two sitting City Council members' unpaid personal utility bills discovered during the review, plus a 2020 precedent involving a different Council member. Fetched directly as a PDF from files.nc.gov and read page-by-page. files.nc.gov · original document
  • City of Rocky Mount, North Carolina, City of Rocky Mount, North Carolina -- FY2024 Annual (Comprehensive Financial) Report (2024-12-01)The City's own audited annual financial statements for FY2024, used here to independently corroborate the state auditor's population figure and to supply the General Fund's own total expenditures for context against the audit's all-funds spending total. Fetched directly as a PDF from rockymountnc.gov and read page-by-page. rockymountnc.gov · original document
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