SBA's Disaster Loan Program Ran Dry, Then Cut the Staff Anyway
Summary
In October 2024 the Small Business Administration ran out of money to make disaster loans for the first time since the program began in 1953. Eight months later it had also cut the staff servicing its $336.4 billion COVID-era loan portfolio to 819 people — 45% below the level its own inspector general had just called adequate.
The account ran dry mid-hurricane season
The disaster loan program isn't funded like most federal programs. Congress gives it a pool of "credit subsidy" money — the estimated long-run cost of the loans it's about to make — and that pool has to last until the next appropriation, no matter how many disasters happen in between. Going into FY2024, carried forward $406.2 million in unspent subsidy funds and collected $40.6 million more in recoveries on old loans, for $446.8 million available. FY2024 disaster lending — $1.7 billion in loans, more than 27,000 of them, at a 20.55% subsidy rate — cost $341.4 million of that, leaving just $99.8 million to carry into FY2025.
View data as table
| Carried forward from FY2023 | $406.2M | inflow, net of a $5,175 cost modification |
|---|---|---|
| Recoveries from prior-year loans | $40.6M | inflow |
| Cost of FY2024 disaster lending | $341.4M | outflow — 27,000+ loans |
| Cost of reinstated prior-year loans | $5.6M | outflow |
| Carried to FY2025 | $99.8M | outflow — insufficient for the year ahead |
$99.8 million looks like money in the bank until you remember what it has to survive. Hurricanes Helene and Milton hit weeks into FY2025, and on October 15, 2024, SBA announced it had exhausted funds for new disaster loans — by then it had already logged roughly 37,000 Helene-related applications. Per the Congressional Research Service, that was the first credit-subsidy funding lapse since began making disaster loans in 1953: for 67 days, the agency kept accepting and processing applications but couldn't issue new loan offers, queuing eligible borrowers until Congress acted. It acted on December 21, 2024, when the American Relief Act, 2025 (P.L. 118-158) delivered a $2.25 billion supplemental — more than five times what had run out.
The other half of the job: a $336 billion loan book, thinly staffed
While the front door was rationing new loans, the back office was servicing everything already on the books — mostly COVID-era EIDLs, a portfolio SBA's inspector general describes as "over 14 times what the agency was managing before the pandemic," when typically serviced about 263,000 disaster loans worth roughly $9.4 billion. Today it's about 3.8 million loans worth $336.4 billion, run out of a single processing center in Fort Worth, Texas.
View data as table
| Oct. 8, 2024 | 1,492 | SBA OIG Report 25-16 — found adequately staffed |
|---|---|---|
| June 2025 | 819 | SBA OIG Report 26-01 — effect not yet assessed |
As of October 8, 2024, that center had 1,492 staff — enough, found, to call it "adequately staffed," clearing more than 23,500 servicing actions a month at a 5.44-day average cycle time. By June 2025, per 's December 2025 follow-up, staffing had been cut to about 819 — a 45% reduction below the level the agency's own watchdog had just signed off on. 's verdict: "Since these staff reductions occurred after our review, has not assessed any potential impact on the agency's servicing of the $336.4 billion COVID-19 EIDL disaster loan portfolio."
The cut wasn't unique to Fort Worth. In March 2025 SBA announced an agency-wide reorganization eliminating about 2,700 of its roughly 6,500 positions — a 43% cut, saving a projected $435 million a year — while stating that "disaster assistance programs" would "not be impacted." The Fort Worth numbers say otherwise: the center that runs the disaster loan book was already cut well past the line had called adequate.
Meanwhile the outreach borrowers depend on to even know their options has gone uneven. A May 2026 GAO review of 76 disaster declarations found 's East regional office included updated, survivor-relevant rule-change information in 96% of its press releases and fact sheets — the West office, in just 5%. And in Los Angeles, more than a year after the January 2025 wildfires, has now extended loan disbursement deadlines three times — most recently to July 1, 2026 — citing permitting backlogs that have slowed nearly 13,000 borrowers' ability to draw down $3.4 billion in already-approved loans.
The takeaway
- The account nearly failed the test it exists for. 's disaster loan credit-subsidy fund ran out of money for the first time in the program's 73-year history, right as two hurricanes hit — a 67-day lapse that new loans simply couldn't cross.
- The staffing cut ignored the agency's own watchdog. called 1,492 staff adequate to service the disaster loan portfolio in October 2024. By June 2025 that was 819 — a cut the agency made anyway, with no assessment yet of what it costs borrowers.
- The portfolio didn't shrink to match. is still servicing a $336.4 billion book of COVID-era loans — over 14 times the size of what it managed before the pandemic — with a processing center it just cut nearly in half.
Dollar and staffing figures span multiple reports, 's May 2026 review, and 's analysis of 's own monthly reports to Congress, each cited inline; portfolio figures include an estimated 1.1 million charged-off loans has been temporarily exempted from transferring to Treasury for collection.
Sources
- Office of Inspector General, COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan Servicing Capability (Report 25-16, May 29, 2025) — the Oct. 2024 staffing count (1,492) and 's "adequately staffed" finding, plus the pre-pandemic portfolio baseline (263,000 loans, $9.4 billion) and the COVID EIDL totals (nearly 4 million loans, over $377 billion). oversight.gov
- Office of Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the in Fiscal Year 2026 (Report 26-01, Dec. 18, 2025) — the current $336.4 billion / 3.8 million-loan portfolio, the June 2025 staffing count (819), and the funding-lapse timeline. oversight.gov
- Congressional Research Service, Disaster Loans Program Account: Overview and Policy Options (R48558) — the FY2024 credit-subsidy account activity (Table 3), the FY2025 funding lapse and its Dec. 2024 resolution via the American Relief Act, 2025. congress.gov
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Disaster Loan Program: Should Ensure Consistent Outreach to Survivors (-26-108688) — FY2024 disaster lending volume (27,000+ loans, $1.7 billion) and the East/West outreach-consistency finding (96% vs. 5%). gao.gov
- U.S. Small Business Administration, Exhausts Funds for New Disaster Loans (Oct. 15, 2024) — the funding-lapse announcement and initial Hurricane Helene application volume. sba.gov
- U.S. Small Business Administration, Small Business Administration Announces Agency-Wide Reorganization (March 21, 2025) — the 43% agency-wide workforce cut (about 2,700 of 6,500 positions) and its claim that disaster assistance programs would not be affected. sba.gov
- U.S. Small Business Administration, Announces Final Disaster Relief Extension for January 2025 Los Angeles Wildfire Survivors (July 1, 2026) — the $3.4 billion approved / nearly 13,000-borrower Los Angeles wildfire case and its repeated disbursement-deadline extensions. sba.gov
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The Small Business Administration's disaster loan program does two things that most people never see: it lends money directly to homeowners and small businesses after a declared disaster, and it services a loan book that stretches back to the COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program — nearly 4 million loans totaling over $377 billion issued between March 2020 and May 2022 alone. Both jobs ran into trouble in the same year, for the same underlying reason: the account is smaller than the workload, and in 2024–2025 it got smaller still.