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The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC)

USITC never reviewed the contract for its own building security

Summary

The U.S. International Trade Commission pays the Federal Protective Service about $2.4 million a year to guard the leased building where its 433 employees work. A June 29, 2026 inspector general management letter, issued mid-audit, found USITC's security office had never reviewed the underlying guard contract, kept no monitoring procedures, and could not verify what it was buying -- and that the building's own security log, the Post Orders, had been removed and shredded without the Commission's knowledge.

By Marcus Aurelius · September 12, 2026

The U.S. International Trade Commission's Office of Security Services is responsible for protecting the leased Washington building where the agency's 433 employees work, largely through an interagency agreement (IA) with the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service (FPS) -- an approximately $2.4 million arrangement in Fiscal Year 2025. A June 29, 2026 management letter from USITC's own Inspector General, issued mid-audit because the findings 'warrant prompt management action,' says the Commission's security staff could not verify or describe the basic services that money was buying -- and that the document meant to record what guards actually did at the building had been destroyed without the Commission ever knowing.

A contract nobody at USITC had read

The Office of Security Services (OSS) told the 's audit team it couldn't review activity logs because the underlying contract between FPS and the private security firm guarding the building -- along with the on-site "Post Orders" -- prohibited it. The OIG checked: the Commission had never reviewed or even possessed that contract. FPS leadership separately told the that USITC receives no reports at all on building access control -- that information exists only in the Post Orders kept at the guard desk -- and confirmed there is no Memorandum of Understanding spelling out which agency is responsible for what. No such language appears in the IA itself either.

FY2025 interagency agreement for building/security services
~$2.4M
paid to the Federal Protective Service; USITC documented no procedures for monitoring what it bought
Underlying FPS security contract USITC had reviewed
0
the Commission had never reviewed or possessed the contract, per the OIG -- despite staff first citing it to explain why they couldn't monitor logs
USITC staff working in the building this agreement covers
433
the Commission's entire FY2025 headcount, per its own FY2027 budget justification
Where the $2.4 million sits
USITC's FY2025 actual obligations, nested down to the unverified security agreement
USITC total obligations, FY2025
130,030,000
"Services" obligation category, FY2025
13,739,000
FPS building/security interagency agreement, FY2025
2,400,000
Source: USITC FY2027 Budget Justification, Budget Data (FY2025 actuals); USITC OIG Management Letter OIG-ML-26-05
View data as table
USITC's FY2025 obligations, narrowed to the unverified security spending
USITC total obligations, FY2025130,030,000
"Services" obligation category, FY202513,739,000Includes contracted security guards, IT service desk, and financial audits, per USITC's own footnote
FPS building/security interagency agreement, FY20252,400,000The OIG found no one at USITC had reviewed the underlying contract or documented monitoring procedures for this spending

The document that vanished

When auditors tried to inspect the Post Orders in person, the on-site guards and their supervisor couldn't produce them, saying they'd been told the document was out for "updating." went to FPS leadership directly, who said the Post Orders were supposed to remain at USITC. FPS then reported back: the Post Orders had been removed and shredded -- something the Commission itself did not know until the told it. Separately, when auditors asked to see the Post Orders review that OSS said it had performed as part of routine monitoring, OSS instead produced an FPS email stating the documents were restricted from release. The 's assessment of OSS's explanations throughout the audit was blunt: they were unsupported by contemporaneous records, could not be independently verified, and in several cases contradicted other evidence gathered during the fieldwork -- "to the point of raising serious credibility issues."

What the OIG still can't answer

The letter is explicit about its limits: it was issued mid-audit, wasn't performed under generally accepted government auditing standards, and offers no formal recommendations -- the full audit of USITC's badge-access controls continues. But after interviewing OSS staff and reviewing the available email and document trail, the says it still cannot determine whether OSS has demonstrated the expertise to oversee the FPS agreement, has reviewed any evidence that FPS is fulfilling its responsibilities, has set up basic protocols to check whether the services meet USITC's needs, or has actually received everything the agreement describes. The frames the gap as a mismatch between the oversight this money got and the oversight it needed: an administrative, paperwork-level approach might suffice for lower-risk contracts, but physical security for a federal workforce, the letter argues, is not one of them.

  • The contract was never reviewed. OSS staff cited the FPS-contractor agreement to explain why they couldn't monitor guard logs -- then it emerged the Commission had never possessed or read that agreement.
  • There is no written division of responsibility. FPS confirmed no Memorandum of Understanding exists between the two agencies, and the interagency agreement itself is silent on it.
  • The one document that recorded what happened at the building is gone. The Post Orders were removed and shredded without USITC's knowledge, discovered only when auditors tried to inspect them in person.
  • The calls it a culture, not an incident. The letter's stated purpose is to prompt 'prompt management action' against what it terms 'a culture of minimal engagement' with the agreement's oversight -- issued before its badge-access audit is even finished.

This management letter (-ML-26-05) was issued mid-audit and explicitly states it was not performed under generally accepted government auditing standards and carries no formal recommendations; a fuller badge-access-controls audit from the same was still underway as of the letter's June 29, 2026 date. Budget and staffing figures used for context -- USITC's FY2025 total obligations ($130.03 million), its FY2025 'Services' obligation category ($13.74 million), and its FY2025 staffing level (433 FTEs) -- come from USITC's own FY2027 congressional budget justification, read directly.

Sources(2) ▾
  • U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of Inspector General, Management Letter -- Inadequate Oversight of the Interagency Agreement for Building and Security Services (OIG-ML-26-05) (2026-06-29)The USITC Inspector General's June 29, 2026 management letter, issued mid-audit to flag urgent internal-control weaknesses in the Commission's oversight of its interagency agreement with the Federal Protective Service (FPS) for basic building and security services. Signed by the Inspector General and addressed to the Commission's chairman. The letter states plainly that it 'was not performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and does not present any conclusions or recommendations' -- it is a mid-audit alert, not a completed audit report. Hosted on oversight.gov, 's official federal- portal; a fresh Wayback capture was requested at read time. oversight.gov · original document
  • U.S. International Trade Commission, United States International Trade Commission Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Justification (2026-02-11)USITC's own FY2027 congressional budget justification, submitted with the FY2027 President's Budget. Its Budget Data section (Obligations: Comparison by Budget Object Classification) gives FY2025 ACTUAL total obligations, the FY2025 'Services' obligation category (which its own footnote defines as including, among other things, contracted security guards), and FY2025 actual staffing (FTEs) -- used here only to size the $2.4 million FPS agreement against the Commission's own budget and headcount. usitc.gov blocks non-browser fetches (HTTP 403); the capture above is a Wayback save, consistent with this newsroom's prior use of the same document. usitc.gov · original document
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