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Buried utility damage

The Call-Before-You-Dig System Set a Goal to Cut Damage in Half. The Damage Went Up Instead.

Summary

The 811 locate system fielded 43.5 million requests in 2024 — built in the 1970s for a fraction of that. It still produced 189,052 reported hits on buried gas, water and fiber lines, an estimated $30 billion in damage, and in Lexington, Missouri, a gas main nobody marked killed a five-year-old boy. The industry's own damage index rose for a second straight year, moving away from its declared target of cutting damage in half by 2028.

By Locusta · July 10, 2026

Every time someone digs — a homeowner setting a fence post, a crew trenching for fiber — the law requires a call to 811 first, so a locator can come out and mark whatever is buried underneath. On April 9, 2025, in Lexington, Missouri, that happened exactly as designed. A subcontractor called 811 five days ahead of the job; a Liberty Utilities locator marked the lines. That evening, a drill struck a capped gas main more than three hours before the leak ignited. Per the National Transportation Safety Board's preliminary report, the section of main that was hit "was not identified or marked" during the locate at all — not marked wrong, simply missed. The explosion killed five-year-old Alistair Lamb and injured his father and sister. Every step of the process was followed. It failed anyway, and the numbers say that kind of failure is close to routine.

Estimated annual damage cost
$30B
industry estimate, cited to Congress, Feb. 2025
811 locate requests, 2024
43.5M
vs. under 1M/yr the system was built for
CGA Damage Index, 2024
96.7
up from 94.0 in 2023 vs target: 50, by 2028

Follow the dollar

The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) — the trade association that runs the industry's shared damage-reporting system — told Congress in February 2025 that hitting buried gas, water, power and telecom lines during excavation "costs the U.S. a staggering $30 billion every year", counting repairs, service restoration, and the businesses and residents cut off while crews fix what broke. That figure is the industry's own estimate, not an audited government number — there is no independent national accounting of the total. What is independently counted, damage event by damage event, is where the fault lies. CGA's 2024 DIRT Report puts it plainly: "Root cause distribution spans all major stakeholder groups — notification failures (26%), locating practices (34%) and excavation practices (33%)." No single group owns the problem.

Who caused the damage, 2024
Share of reported damages to buried utilities in the U.S. and Canada, by responsible stakeholder group
Locating practices
34%
Excavation practices
33%
Notification failures
26%
Other / unclassified
7%
Source: Common Ground Alliance, 2024 DIRT Report, Executive Summary
View data as table
Root cause share, 2024
Locating practices34%locator error
Excavation practices33%excavator error
Notification failures26%no 811 call placed
Other / unclassified7%

Locators — the technicians who paint and flag where a line actually runs — are blamed for slightly more damage (34%) than the excavators who dig (33%), with failure to even call 811 in the first place a close third (26%). That three-way split is why CGA's recommendations aren't aimed at one party: they call for enforceable standards on excavators, locators, and the utilities whose maps the locators work from.

The same system, counted in requests

None of that dollar figure is a staffing story in the way Social Security's is — there's no single federal payroll behind it. But the system that's supposed to prevent the damage runs on a fixed process, built for a specific era, straining under a volume nobody designed it for.

The 811 system's workload, then and now
Incoming locate requests per year — the volume the system was built to handle vs. what it handled in 2024
System designed for (~1974)
1,000,000
811 requests processed, 2024
43,533,423
Source: NULCA (design-era estimate); Common Ground Alliance, 2024 DIRT Report (2024 volume)
View data as table
811 locate request volume
System designed for (~1974)<1M/yrNULCA, March 2026
811 requests processed, 202443,533,423CGA 2024 DIRT Report

The National Utility Locating Contractors Association — NULCA, the trade group for the companies whose technicians do the actual marking — put it starkly in a paper published this spring: the 811 system "was designed roughly fifty years ago for a world processing less than one million locate requests per year... That made sense in 1974." By CGA's own count, the U.S. system fielded 43,533,423 incoming locate requests in 2024 alone — generating nearly 265 million transmissions to the utilities that have to respond to each one. The architecture, NULCA argues, has not changed to match: the same free-to-excavators, first-come queue built for a fraction of the volume.

That strain shows up as delay. Analyzing data from eight 811 centers, the 2024 DIRT Report found excavators faced an average 38% chance of being unable to start work on schedule because a locate response was incomplete — a coin flip that, NULCA argues, quietly erodes the incentive to call 811 at all, since waiting on a locator often means missing a deadline anyway. And the money behind the labor is thin relative to the job: NULCA cites one case of "a major Midwest utility" budgeting $15 million for a year of locating services, then running it through "a procurement process designed to squeeze another 15% out of it" — a contract, the group argues, that guarantees an underfunded locating company, overloaded technicians, and turnover that puts undertrained locators back in the field within weeks.

The takeaway

  • No single group is failing alone. Damage responsibility splits almost evenly three ways — locators, excavators, and excavators who never called 811 at all. Fixing one group's error rate barely moves the total.
  • The system outgrew its own design by more than 40 times over, per NULCA, and the architecture — a free, first-come locate queue — hasn't changed to absorb it.
  • The industry's own scorecard is moving the wrong way. CGA announced a "50 in 5" goal in 2023 to cut damages in half by 2028. Its damage index rose from 94.0 in 2023 to 96.7 in 2024 — the second straight year it moved further from, not closer to, that target.
  • The failure mode isn't hypothetical. In Lexington, Missouri, every step of the process — the call, the locate, the mark — was followed, and a section of gas main was still missed entirely. A five-year-old boy died.

The $30 billion damage-cost figure is the Common Ground Alliance's own estimate, presented to Congress in February 2025; no independently audited national total exists. The 43,533,423 and 189,052 figures for 2024 are the U.S.-only columns from CGA's DIRT Report data tables, which report the U.S. and Canada separately. The NTSB's findings on the Lexington, Missouri explosion are preliminary and subject to change as the investigation continues.

Sources

  • Common Ground Alliance, 2024 DIRT Report (published Aug. 28, 2025) — the annual damage-count, root-cause, and 811-ticket-volume data used throughout this piece, including the 189,052 U.S. unique damage events, the 43,533,423 U.S. incoming locate requests, the 34%/33%/26% root-cause breakdown, the 38% late-locate rate, and the CGA Index (94.0 in 2023, 96.7 in 2024). dirt.commongroundalliance.com
  • Common Ground Alliance, press release on the 2024 DIRT Report (Aug. 28, 2025) — confirms the CGA Index trend and root-cause figures in plain-language form. commongroundalliance.com
  • Common Ground Alliance, written statement submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 25, 2025 hearing record) — the $30 billion annual damage-cost estimate and the origin and terms of the "50 in 5" industry challenge (announced 2023, target 2028). congress.gov
  • National Utility Locating Contractors Association (NULCA), "This System Is Designed to Fail. We're Done Pretending Otherwise." (March 30, 2026) — the 811 system's original 1970s design capacity (under 1 million requests/year), the 43.5 million-request comparison, and the $15 million Midwest utility locating-contract example. nulca.org
  • National Transportation Safety Board, preliminary investigation PLD25LR004 — the April 9, 2025 Lexington, Missouri gas explosion: cause, casualties, and the finding that the section of main struck was never marked. ntsb.gov
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