The Pentagon's weapons portfolio grew by $51.8 billion. Its workforce didn't.
Summary
DOD's costliest weapon programs now total $2.4 trillion, up $51.8 billion in a year, per GAO's 2026 assessment. Over the same year, 40 of the 48 programs GAO reviewed reported losing staff — part of a resignation wave that pulled more than 48,000 people out of the department.
Where the growth came from
's portfolio of 104 costliest weapon programs — 75 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), 23 rapid-prototyping "Middle Tier" programs, and six future major acquisitions — now tops $2.4 trillion, found. The MDAP core of that portfolio alone grew by a net $51.8 billion over the past year. That net figure hides more churn than it shows: among the 72 MDAPs with comparable cost data, 46 programs reported cost growth totaling $122.08 billion, while 16 reported cuts totaling $47.3 billion. The net doesn't reduce to increases-minus-decreases because the portfolio itself changed shape — four fewer programs were in scope this year than last.
View data as table
| Cost increases (46 of 72 MDAPs) | $122.08B | programs reporting growth |
|---|---|---|
| Cost decreases (16 of 72 MDAPs) | $47.3B | programs reporting cuts |
| Net increase, full MDAP portfolio | $51.8B | year over year |
The two programs driving the biggest increases were the CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford nuclear aircraft carrier (a quantity increase) and the SSBN 826 Columbia Class ballistic missile submarine. Meanwhile the overall time to deliver a new capability — from program start to a warfighter actually getting it — rose to over 12 years, and warns that figure will likely climb further, since several programs are holding delivery dates static rather than admitting new delays.
Where the staff went
Ask the 48 programs reviewed against its leading-practices checklist how their staffing held up, and the answer is almost uniformly bad: 40 of 48 reported some kind of acquisition workforce challenge. traces most of it to one event — the Department of Defense's Deferred Resignation Program, announced by the Secretary of Defense on March 28, 2025, under which federal employees could resign and go on paid leave rather than risk a layoff. From January through June 2025, more than 48,000 employees — 6.3% of the department's civilian workforce — were approved to leave, per GAO's companion federal workforce tracker. A concurrent, department-wide civilian hiring freeze made it hard to backfill any of it.
View data as table
| Any acquisition workforce challenge | 40 / 48 | programs assessed |
|---|---|---|
| Staff reductions (military, civilian, or contractor) | 37 / 48 | programs assessed |
| Hiring or retention difficulty | 33 / 48 | programs assessed |
| Hiring freeze cited as an obstacle | 25 / 48 | programs assessed |
| Higher workloads from reduced staff | 12 / 48 | programs assessed |
| Lost institutional knowledge | 7 / 48 | programs assessed |
The individual program accounts are the sharpest part of the report. One program office lost 38% of its core personnel between December 2024 and December 2025 and could backfill only a third of the departed staff. Another lost 31 people to the DRP — nearly 6% of its workforce — with no replacements. A third lost seven civilian positions it still can't backfill under the hiring freeze; the officials who remain told they now work weekends to keep the program from visibly slipping. Twelve programs said the reduced staff means more work per remaining employee; seven said they've lost institutional knowledge outright. None of this shows up in the $2.4 trillion topline. It shows up later, in schedule.
The takeaway
- The portfolio got $51.8 billion more expensive while the people managing it got 6.3% smaller. Both numbers come from the same report, covering the same 12-month window.
- 83% of the programs checked — 40 of 48 — reported a workforce problem, mostly staff reductions or new difficulty hiring and retaining people, largely traced to one resignation program and one hiring freeze.
- The cost of thin staffing doesn't show up as a line item. It shows up as a 12-year average delivery time, employees working weekends to cover for colleagues who left, and institutional knowledge that doesn't come back once it's gone.
Figures cover 's 104 costliest weapon programs as assessed in 's 2026 report (data currency generally through late 2025 or early 2026, per-program); the $51.8 billion MDAP net-cost figure and the $122.08 billion / $47.3 billion increase/decrease totals are drawn from overlapping but not identical program sets, as itself notes.
Sources
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Requiring Mature Technologies Could Enable Shift to Rapid Delivery, -26-108457 (July 2, 2026) — the source for the $2.4 trillion portfolio total, the $51.8 billion MDAP cost increase, the $122.08 billion / $47.3 billion increase/decrease breakdown, the 12-year average delivery cycle time, and all acquisition-workforce figures (pp. 12, 14, 53-55). gao.gov/products/gao-26-108457
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Agency Workforce Changes: Update for January to June 2025, -26-108719 (Feb. 24, 2026) — the source, cited within -26-108457, for the 48,000+ employees (6.3% of the department) approved for the Deferred Resignation Program. gao.gov/products/gao-26-108719
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Every July, the Government Accountability Office totals up what the Pentagon's most expensive weapon programs cost and asks the people running them how it's going. This year's answer, GAO's 24th annual Weapon Systems Assessment, is a portfolio that got more expensive and a workforce that got smaller — at the same time, on the same programs.